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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey reviews Florida appellate court decisions and legislation
enacted during 2006 and 2007 of potential, immediate interest to business
owners and their counsel. A quick glance at the table of contents reminds the
reader of a few of the many distinct areas of the law that have a direct, or at
least a significant peripheral impact, on doing business in Florida.
The survey does not include every case decided by the Supreme Court
of Florida and the five District Courts of Appeal that could be said to affect
business owners. Only those cases that appear to be of special interest, have
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unusual facts, involve conflicts certified to the Supreme Court of Florida by
the District Courts of Appeal, clarify or expand existing principles of law, or
address matters of first impression made the cut. Several federal court deci-
sions have also been included, the first case in the survey being a decision of
the United States Supreme Court.'
There were also important legislative developments that persons engag-
ing in business in Florida will need to consider. Therefore, an overview of
some of the legislation enacted in 2006 and 2007 has been included. The
reader's own in-depth analysis of the statutes is strongly suggested.
II. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Arbitration
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Cardegna /),2 Mr. Car-
degna (Cardegna) entered into an agreement with Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. (Buckeye) that purported to require submission of all controversies to
binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), if a party
to the agreement (or certain third parties) elected arbitration.3 The agree-
ment also provided that the FAA would apply.4 Cardegna sued Buckeye in
Florida state court claiming that "Buckeye charged usurious interest rates." 5
He also alleged that the agreement violated various other Florida laws and
was "criminal on its face."6 Buckeye asked the court to order arbitration.7
The trial court ruled that a court, not an arbitrator, decides if "a contract is
illegal and void ab initio."8 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court, but the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the Fourth District
Court of Appeal.9 The Supreme Court of Florida, ruling in favor of
Cardegna, concluded that it would violate Florida public policy and contract
law to enforce an arbitration clause in a contract challenged as unlawful.'"
The United States Supreme Court granted Buckeye's petition for certiorari."
1. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Cardegna 1), 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 442-43 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 443.
6. Cardegna I, 546 U.S. at 443.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 446.
11. Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. at 443.
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Justice Scalia stated the issue as, "whether a court or an arbitrator
should consider the claim that a contract containing an arbitration provision
is void for illegality." 12 The United States Supreme Court, relying on its
decisions in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.' 3 and
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 14 reversed the Supreme Court of Florida. 5 The
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that an arbitration clause
in a contract involving a transaction subject to the FAA is severable from the
contract as a whole.' 6 This is so even if the contract is alleged to be void and
illegal under state law. 7 Under the FAA, the issue of the validity of the con-
tract itself is to be heard in the first instance by the arbitrator, and this applies
in both state and federal courts. 8 Had the challenge been to the validity of
the arbitration clause, a court would have been the proper forum in the first
instance. '9
The Court noted that there is also a distinction between the issue of the
validity of the contract, which is to be determined by the arbitrator, and the
issue of the existence of a contract in the first place.2° Included in the latter
category are determinations such as whether the person against whom the
contract was sought to be enforced ever signed the contract, whether the per-
son signing had the authority to sign on behalf of an alleged principal, and
issues of capacity. 21 The Court declined to rule on whether the courts or the
arbitrator should decide questions regarding the existence of contract. 22 Jus-
tice Thomas dissented, stating that it remains his position that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply in state court proceedings.23
In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cardegna ,
Florida's appellate courts reviewed some of their decisions under the FAA.24
12. Id. at442.
13. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
14. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
15. Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. at 448-49.
16. Id. at 445.
17. Id. at 446.
18. Id. at 445-46.
19. Id. at 445.
20. Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. at 444.
21. Id. at 444 n.l.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Betts v. Fastfunding the Co. (Belts 1), 950 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2006) (remand-
ing to the Fifth District Court of Appeal in light of Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. 440); Cardegna v.
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. (Cardegna I1), 930 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2006) (on remand from the
United States Supreme Court); Fastfunding the Co. v. Betts (Betts I1), 951 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (on remand from the Supreme Court of Florida, remanding to the trial
court to refer to arbitration pursuant to Cardegna 1). The Supreme Court of Florida in turn
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In addition, several important decisions involving the Florida Arbitration
Code were rendered.25 The Supreme Court of Florida, in O'Keefe Architects,
Inc. v. CED Construction Partners, Ltd. ,26 addressed the issue of whether the
arbitrator or the trial court should have ruled on a statute of limitations de-
fense to arbitration. 2' The case was before the Supreme Court of Florida
based on conflict certified by the Fifth District Court of Appeal with the
Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Reuter Recycling of Florida,
Inc. v. City of Dania Beach.28 0 'Keefe Architects, Inc. involved a claim by
CED, a contractor, against O'Keefe, an architect, for damages arising from
alleged negligent design and construction.29 The arbitration clause in ques-
tion3" provided in part that, "[i]n no event shall the demand for arbitration be
made after the date when institution of legal or equitable proceedings based
on such claim, dispute or other matter in question would be barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations."'"
CED filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration As-
sociation.32  O'Keefe objected, arguing that arbitration was barred by the
remanded Cardegna II to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Cardegna 11, 930 So. 2d at
611. The Fourth District Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court, which en-
tered an order compelling arbitration and staying proceedings. Order Granting Defendant
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.'s Motion For An Order Compelling Arbitration And Staying
Proceedings at 1, Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., No.
502001CA001 162XXXOCAJ (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 23, 2006); see also Reuter v. McKenzie
Check Advance of Fla., L.L.C., 825 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied,
930 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2006).
25. See, e.g., O'Keefe Architects, Inc. v. CED Constr. Partners, Ltd., 944 So. 2d 181 (Fla.
2006); Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Bryant, 937 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see
also infra notes 27, 39, 61.
26. 944 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2006).
27. Id. at 183.
28. 859 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
29. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 183. CED fixed certain problems on a con-
struction project upon demand of the property owners and the property owners assigned to
CED their claim against O'Keefe, the architect. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida declined to
address O'Keefe's contention that the claim was not assignable, since the issue was not in-
cluded in the conflict certified by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. Id. at 183 n.2.
30. Id. The arbitration clause was contained in two contracts between O'Keefe Archi-
tects, Inc., as the architect, and Vero Club Partners Ltd. and Clearwater Phase I Partners Ltd.,
the property owners who had assigned their claims against O'Keefe to CED Construction
Partners, Ltd. Id. at 183. CED Construction Partners, Ltd. was not a party to the agreements
that contained the arbitration clauses. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 183.
31. Id. at 184. The parties agreed, and the Court confirmed, that the Florida Arbitration
Code, not the Federal Arbitration Act, applied, there being no interstate commerce involved.
Id; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-.22 (2005).
32. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 183.
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statute of limitations, but the arbitrator disagreed.33 O'Keefe then filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court, seeking a ruling that the trial court, not the
arbitrator, was required to decide the statute of limitations issue. 3' The trial
court declined to grant the requested relief and O'Keefe appealed.35 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court, but certified con-
flict with Reuter Recycling of Florida, Inc.36 The Supreme Court of Florida,
interpreting the Florida Arbitration Code and citing Stinson-Head, Inc. v.
City of Sanibel,37 upheld the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal. 31
In resolving the conflict, the Court noted that both cases involved arbitration
provisions with "similar language regarding timelines,"39 and concluded that
under the broad clauses in question, the arbitrator was the proper arbiter of
the statute of limitations defense.4'
Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Bryant41 arose from Mrs. Bryant's resi-
dency at Alterra Healthcare Corp's (Alterra) Vero Beach facility and later,
another Alterra facility in Vero Beach.42 Mrs. Bryant's husband, acting un-
der a durable power of attorney given to him by Mrs. Bryant, checked her
into both facilities.43 Mr. Byrant signed a residency agreement on Mrs. Bry-
ant's behalf when she entered the first facility, but no agreement was signed
when she moved to the second facility. 44 Mr. Bryant, as his wife's attorney-
in-fact, sued Alterra, alleging violation of the Assisted Living Facilities Act
and negligence. 45 The residency agreement contained arbitration provisions,
33. Id. The arbitrator ruled against O'Keefe on another issue as well as the statute of
limitations defense. Id. at 184.
34. Id. O'Keefe also argued that CED could not demand arbitration "because the con-
tracts were not assignable." Id.
35. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 184.
36. Id.
37. 661 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
38. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 185-86, 188.
39. Id. at 184.
40. Id. at 188. The Court noted that there were three threshold issues that a court has to
consider with respect to a motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 185. First, is there "a valid
written agreement to arbitrate"; second, is there an arbitrable issue; and third, was the right to
arbitrate waived. Id. (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999)).
The Court noted that there was agreement between CED and O'Keefe that all of these re-
quirements were satisfied. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 185 n.4.
41. 937 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
42. Id. at 265.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 270. The trial court also found that the residency agreement applied to Mrs.
Bryant's stay at the second facility as well as the first facility. Id. at 271. See infra note 398-
401 and accompanying text.
45. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 265.
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and Alterra moved to compel arbitration.46 The arbitration provisions pur-
ported to prohibit punitive damages, limit non-economic damages, prohibit
attorney's fees, waive the right to appeal, and limit discovery.47 The trial
court found that these provisions were void as against public policy under
chapter 400 of the Florida Statutes and the Nursing Home Resident's Rights
Act, and were "egregiously unconscionable. 48  However, the residency
agreement had a severance clause that essentially provided that the invalidity
of some parts of the agreement would not affect the validity of other parts.49
The trial court severed the unenforceable provisions from the enforceable
portions of the arbitration clause and ordered that the parties proceed to bind-
ing arbitration.50 Alterra appealed and Mrs. Bryant cross-appealed. 5' The
Fourth District Court of Appeal stated that the remedial nature of the As-
sisted Living Facilities Act was a matter of first impression for the Florida
appellate courts.52 Analogizing the Assisted Living Facilities Act to the
Nursing Home Residents Act, sections 400.022 and 400.023 of the Florida
Statutes, the court held that the former was also a remedial statute designed
to protect its subjects.53 As a remedial statute, it had the effect of voiding, as
against public policy, the arbitration agreement's punitive damages prohibi-
tion, limit on non-economic damages, attorney's fee award limitation, and
restrictions on discovery.5 4 In addition, the Florida Arbitration Code was
expressly made applicable by the agreement.5 5 The Florida Arbitration Code
allows "a limited right of appeal."56 Thus, prohibiting the appeal was also
void as against public policy.57
Alterra argued that the arbitrator, not the court, should have decided the
validity of the limitations contained in the contract.5 8 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal stated that limit of liability provisions are proper for the
arbitrator, not the trial court, unless they are part of the arbitration clause
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 265-66.
49. Id. at 270.
50. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 265-66.
51. Id. at 265.
52. Id. at 266.
53. Id. The Nursing Home Resident's Act was held to be remedial in Romano ex rel.
Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
54. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 265.
55. Id. at 267.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 267-68.
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itself.' 9 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the limit of li-
ability provisions were part of the arbitration clause itself, and therefore, the
trial court's consideration of the clauses in the first instance, even before
severing them, was proper. In an attempt to convince the court to rule to the
contrary, Alterra argued that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Cardegna I applied, and under Cardegna 1, a challenge to the validity of the
contract had to go to the arbitrator. 60 The Fourth District distinguished Car-
degna I since Mrs. Bryant's challenge was to the provisions of the arbitration
clause itself. 61
The Fourth District Court of Appeal's comments regarding Cardegna I
are interesting. Before distinguishing the facts of Alterra from those of Car-
degna , a case that had been before the Fourth District Court of Appeal and
whose opinion was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, 62 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal said that "[i]n [Cardegna 1], the Supreme
Court of the United States reaffirmed the principle that 'regardless of wheth-
er the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity
of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must
go to the arbitrator."'
63
However, in Cardegna , the United States Supreme Court had before it
an agreement subject to the FAA. 64 The agreement in Alterra expressly pro-
vided that the Florida Arbitration Code applied. 65  Did the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Alterra hold that the principle of Cardegna I applies to
proceedings in Florida state courts subject to the Florida Arbitration Code?
Or was the implication that even if Cardegna I applied, the facts were dis-
tinguishable because the challenge, in the court's view, was to the arbitration
59. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 267; but see O'Keefe Architects, Inc. v. CED
Constr. Partners, Ltd., 944 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 2006) (statute of limitations defense based on
a provision contained within the arbitration clause was proper for the arbitrator in the first
instance). See also supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. Alterra Healthcare Corp. was
decided on September 13, 2006, about a month before O'Keefe Architects, Inc. was decided
by the Supreme Court of Florida on October 19, 2006. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at
181; Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 263. Cardegna I was decided by the United
State Supreme Court on February 21, 2006. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Car-
degna 1), 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
60. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 268.
61. Id. Had the limitations been somewhere else in the agreement, would the result have
been different? This is reminiscent of Judge Schwartz's dissent in Cutler v. Cutler, 32 Fla. L.
Weekly D583, D586 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2007) (Schwartz, J., dissenting). See also
infra note 1296 and accompanying text.
62. Cardegna I, 546 U.S. at 443.
63. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 268.
64. See id; Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. at 442-43.
65. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 267.
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clause itself rather than the contract? The issue of severability was also con-
sidered by the Second District Court of Appeal in Reeves v. Ace Cash Ex-
press, Inc. 66 Mary Reeves, alleging violations of the Florida Consumer Col-
lection Practices Act (FCCPA), sued Ace Cash Express, Inc. 67  The trial
court required her to arbitrate her dispute with Ace Cash Express, Inc. and
she appealed.68 She argued on appeal that enforcement of the arbitration
clause violated public policy, claiming that the arbitration clause failed to
afford her all of the rights and remedies provided under the FCCPA. 69 The
Second District Court of Appeal first noted that under Seifert v. U.S. Home
Corp.,70 a court, before compelling arbitration, must determine that: 1) there
is a valid written agreement to arbitrate; 2) there is an arbitrable issue; and 3)
the right to arbitration has been waived.7' With respect to prong two of the
test,72 Ms. Reeves contended that the issues were not arbitrable because of
the alleged failure to provide the rights available under the FCCPA, which
caused the arbitration agreement to be against public policy. 7
3
The court, before considering the public policy argument, addressed the
question of whether, as a matter of law, claims under the FCCPA are not
arbitrable. 74 The court drew an analogy to its reasoning in Orkin Exterminat-
ing Co. v. Petsch,75 a case involving arbitration under the Florida Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act. 76 There, as in Reeves, the Second District
Court of Appeal concluded that there was no express provision in the appli-
cable statute that would demonstrate the legislature's intent to preclude arbi-
tration. 77 Having so determined, the court in Reeves noted that the question
of whether arbitration of FCCPA claims was against public policy was an
issue of first impression.
7 8
The court concluded that the arbitration agreement did not, with one ex-
ception, prevent Reeves from asking for relief otherwise available under the
66. 937 So. 2d 1136, 1138 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev. denied 952 So. 2d 1191
(Fla. 2007).
67. Id. at 1137.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999).
71. Reeves, 937 So. 2d at 1137 (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636).
72. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's determination under
prong one of the test that there was a valid written agreement to arbitrate. Reeves, 937 So. 2d
at 1137.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 872 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
76. Id. at 261; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (2007).
77. Petsch, 872 So. 2d at 261;see also Reeves, 937 So. 2dat 1137.
78. Reeves, 937 So. 2d at 1137.
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FCCPA.79 The exception related to the portion of the arbitration clause that
precluded class actions, which provision was contrary to the FCCPA.8 °
Since the arbitration agreement contained a severability clause, the class ac-
tion prohibition could be severed, leaving the remaining portions of the arbi-
tration agreement intact.8 With respect to all of the other forms of relief that
Reeves claimed were not available in arbitration, the court observed that
although the arbitration clause did not specifically state the types of relief an
arbitrator may grant, an arbitrator generally has the power to fashion equita-
ble remedies.82 The court rejected the public policy argument and af-
firmed.83
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Roth v. Cohen," in determining
if a party had waived arbitration, considered both prong two and prong three
of the Seifert test. 85 Mr. Roth entered into a contract with Mr. Cohen's com-
pany pursuant to which Mr. Cohen would provide home decoration services
and obtain design items for Mr. Roth.86 The design items were to be pro-
vided at cost.87 The contract contained an arbitration clause.8 8 After Mr.
Cohen and Mr. Roth had a falling out, Mr. Roth and his wife, who was not a
party to the contract, met with, and later sent a letter to, the third-party who
had recommended Mr. Cohen.89 At the meeting and in the letter, the Roths
questioned both Mr. Cohen's billing practices and the continued referral of
Mr. Cohen's services by the third person to others in their community.9 ° Mr.
Cohen then sued the Roths for libel, slander, and tortious interference.9' The
Roths filed a counterclaim against Mr. Cohen, alleging, among other claims,
79. Id. at 1137-38.
80. Id. at 1138.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1137. The court also noted that an arbitrator could award punitive damages for
a statutory tort under the FCCPA, even though the arbitration agreement did not specifically
so provide. Reeves, 937 So. 2d at 1138. The court relied on its recent decision in Morton v.
Polivchak, where the court held that an arbitrator may award punitive damages for fraud. 931
So. 2d 935, 941 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
83. Reeves, 937 So. 2d at 1137-38.
84. 941 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
85. Id. at 500.
86. Id. at 498.
87. Id.
88. Id. The relevant clause provided for arbitration of"[a]ny controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof." Roth, 941 So. 2d at 498 (emphasis
and quotations omitted).
89. Id. at 498-99.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 499. The category of the tortious interference claim is not specified in the
opinion. See id. at 498-50 1.
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breach of contract, fraud, and fraud in the inducement. 92 The Roths also
filed a third-party complaint on these grounds against Mr. Cohen's com-
pany.9
3
Mr. Cohen and his company moved to compel arbitration of the Roths'
counterclaim and third-party complaint.94 The trial court ordered the parties
to arbitration on the counterclaim and third-party complaint, and the Roths
appealed. 9' Mr. Cohen argued on appeal that under Seifert, his libel and
slander claims against the Roths were not subject to arbitration. 96 Therefore,
he could not, by filing suit with respect to those claims, be said to have
waived arbitration of the counterclaim and third-party complaint. 97 The
Third District Court of Appeal quoted the Supreme Court of Florida in Sei-
fert, where the court stated that even if there are "'broad arbitration provi-
sions, the determination of whether a particular claim must be submitted to
arbitration ... depends on the existence of some nexus between the dispute
and the contract containing the arbitration clause."'' 98 The Third District
Court of Appeal allowed that under Seifert, for a tort claim to be subject to
an arbitration clause, there has to be at least an issue "'the resolution of
which requires reference to ... the contract itself."' 99 The court found that
Mr. Cohen's claims against the Roths had sufficient nexus with the contract
to bring it within the provisions of the arbitration clause.'00 Further, by filing
suit against the Roths, Mr. Cohen waived his right to arbitration. I"' Mr. Co-
hen could not insist that the Roths arbitrate the counterclaim and third-party
complaint and at the same time proceed to court for resolution of his claims
against the Roths. 1°2 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's order compelling arbitration. 03
92. Roth, 941 So. 2d at 499.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 500.
97. See Roth, 941 So. 2d at 500.
98. Id. at 499 (quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999)).
99. Id. (quoting Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 638).
100. Id. at 500.
101. Id. at 501.
102. Roth, 941 So. 2d at 501.
103. Id. The appellate court reversed only as to the counterclaim against Mr. Cohen, not
the arbitrability of the third-party complaint against his company, since the Roths did not
argue this issue on appeal. Id. at 498 n.1.
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B. Mediation
An agreement reached in mediation was reduced to writing and signed
by the parties and their attorneys in Raho of Pass-A-Grille, Inc. v. Pass-A-
Grille Beach Motel, Inc. " A consent order adopting the mediation agree-
ment was signed by the trial judge.'05 However, when presented with mo-
tions by both parties to enforce the agreement, the trial judge held that there
was no agreement because there was no "real meeting of the minds."l0 6 The
Second District Court of Appeal found that while the agreement was am-
biguous in certain respects, it was not void.'07 The parties were in agreement
as to the essential terms and intended that the agreement bind them.0 8 The
parties' subsequent disagreement about the meaning of the terms and what
was required under the agreement did not warrant the conclusion that there
was no meeting of the minds.'0 9 The trial court should have resolved any
ambiguities based on the evidence introduced rather than concluding that
there was no agreement." 0 Therefore, the decision was reversed and re-
manded for the court to consider the evidence and resolve the ambiguity, "'
The First District Court of Appeal held that the party seeking to enforce
a mediation settlement agreement failed to meet its "strict burden" of proof
that the other party's attorney had "'clear and unequivocal authority to set-
tle' the case in Fivecoat v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. 1 2 In this workers'
compensation case, the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) concluded that
a valid settlement agreement had been reached during mediation between the
claimant and her employer."3 The JCC ordered the claimant to sign the set-
tlement papers."' The claimant appealed.' The appellate court found that
the record showed both a misunderstanding between the claimant and her
attorney and that the attorney did not have the requisite authority to settle." 6
The First District Court of Appeal, did, however, observe that "[a]dherence
104. 923 So. 2d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Raho of Pass-A-Grille, Inc., 923 So. 2d at 565 (citing Blackhawk Heating & Plumb-
ing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 302 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 1974)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 565-66.
112. 928 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Sharick v. Se. Univ. of
Health Servs., Inc., 891 So. 2d 562, 565 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 43-04.
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to this rule does not preclude the application of principles of equity when a
party has relied to its irreparable detriment on the representations of the op-
posing attorney.""17 The First District Court of Appeal reversed and re-
manded. 8
In DVDPlay, Inc. v. DVD 123 LLC," 9 the Third District Court of Ap-
peal held that a mediation clause in a franchise agreement survived the ter-
mination of the agreement.12' The agreement contained a survival provision
that expressly referred by section number to the mediation clause.' 2' DVD
123 LLC requested mediation of issues involving alleged breaches of per-
formance under the franchise agreement. 122 DVDPlay, Inc. refused to medi-
ate, taking the position that as the result of DVD 123 LLC's breach of the
agreement and DVDPlay, Inc.'s termination of the agreement, there was
nothing to mediate. 23 The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed with
that argument, but concluded that mediation had been waived by DVD 123
LLC.124 By not seeking judicial assistance in compelling the mediation, and
filing suit instead, DVD 123 LLC waived mediation. 1
25
C. Enforcement of Settlement Agreements
In Architectural Network, Inc. v. Gulf Bay Land Holdings II, Ltd.,126 the
trial court was asked to enforce a purported settlement agreement.127 Archi-
tectural Network, Inc. alleged that its attorney did not have the authority to
settle on its behalf. 28 The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing
before it ruled that there was a valid settlement agreement and entered an
order enforcing the agreement.121 On appeal, Gulf Bay Land Holdings II,
Ltd. argued that the existence of the contract was undisputed. 3 0 The Second
District Court of Appeal cited Fivecoat, noting that the transcript failed to
show that Gulf Bay Land Holding II, Ltd. had demonstrated that the exis-
117. Fivecoat, 928 So. 2d at 404. The court noted that application of this exception would
require factual determinations and therefore "is appropriately raised" at the trial level. Id.
118. Id.
119. 930 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
120. Id. at 819.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 817.
123. Id.
124. DVDPlay, Inc., 930 So. 2d at 818.
125. See id. at 818-19.
126. 933 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
127. Id. at 733.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 733-34.
130. Id. at 733.
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tence of a valid settlement agreement was undisputed.'31 Architectural Net-
work, Inc. was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of its attorney's
authority to settle. 
132
In Masztal v. City of Miami, 133 the trial court set aside a settlement
based upon breach by the original plaintiffs in what was to be a class action,
and their attorneys, of the fiduciary duty owed by them to Mr. Masztal and
the others in the class. '34 The Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the
trial court that the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty to those other class
members. 135 This was true even though the class had not been certified at the
time the settlement agreement was concluded. 136 The trial court found that
this "was an implied class action."' 137 The original lawsuit had been brought
as a class action and certification was certain; it was a mere ministerial act.'38
III. BUSINESS ENTITIES AND AGREEMENTS
A. Franchises
In addition to the waiver of mediation issue discussed earlier in the sur-
vey, the Third District Court of Appeal, in DVDPlay, Inc. was called upon to
determine if a forum selection provision survived the termination of a fran-
chise agreement.139 The principal places of business of DVDPlay, Inc., the
franchisor, and DVD 123 LLC, the franchisee, were California and Florida,
respectively. 4 ' The franchise agreement between DVDPlay, Inc. and DVD
123 LLC provided that any legal action instituted under the agreement must
be brought in California. 14 The agreement also stated that disputes between
the parties were "first . . . subject to non-binding mediation."' 142 Disputes
arose and the parties accused each other of breach of contract. 143 DVDPlay,
Inc. refused to go to mediation and declared that the agreement was termi-
nated.'44 DVD 123 LLC, alleging breach of contract, sued DVDPlay, Inc. in
131. ArchitecturalNetwork, Inc., 933 So. 2d at 733.
132. Id. at 733-34.
133. 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1881 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007).
134. Id. at D1881, D1883.
135. Id. atD 1884.
136. Id. at D1883.
137. Id.
138. Masztal, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1883.
139. DVDPlay, Inc. v. DVD 123 LLC, 930 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. DVDPlay, Inc., 930 So. 2d at 817.
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Florida. 145 DVDPlay, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint alleging improper
venue based on the forum selection clause. 146 The trial court denied the mo-
tion holding that because DVDPlay, Inc. "had repudiated the agreement, it
could not enforce the forum selection clause." 147 The trial court, in ruling for
DVD 123 LLC, relied on Aberdeen Golf & Country Club v. Bliss Construc-
tion, Inc. 148 for the proposition that when the contract was terminated, the
forum selection clause was also terminated. 149 The Third District Court of
Appeal distinguished Aberdeen by noting that the arbitration clause involved
there was intended to function during the term of the agreement. 5 ° Further-
more, the court noted how the Aberdeen court stressed the lack of a survival
clause in the agreement.' 5' The Third District Court of Appeal reversed.' 52
The forum selection provision will survive unless it is expressly or implicitly
provided in the agreement that the forum selection clause is not intended to
survive termination of the agreement. 153 The trial court must enforce a man-
datory forum selection clause absent a showing that it would be unreasonable
or unfair, as the result of unequal bargaining positions of the parties to en-
force the provision-an argument the Third District Court of Appeal noted
had not been raised by DVD 123 LLC. 1
5 4
B. Limited Liability Companies
The operating agreement of a limited liability company specified as an
event of dissolution the "'sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of
[the company's] property and assets."" 55 The agreement also provided that
the company's "net cash flow" after taxes would be reinvested or, at the elec-
tion of the members, distributed to them. 15 6 The company purchased some
real estate, and then it sold the real estate at a profit. 57 As a result, the com-
pany then held only cash. 5' A member sought to have the sale declared a
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 932 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
149. DVDPlay, Inc., 930 So. 2d at 818.
150. Id. at 819.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 820.
153. Id. at 819-20.
154. DVDPIay, Inc., 930 So. 2d at 818.
155. O'Neal v. Blackerby, 950 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 425-26.
158. Seeid. at 426.
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dissolution event, alleging there were no assets. '59 The other parties asserted
that the cash was being held for reinvestment, was an asset, and was a sub-
stantial asset."r The trial court, on motion for summary judgment, ruled, as
a matter of law, that the cash was not a company asset and the sale was a
dissolution event. 6 ' The First District Court of Appeal reversed. 162 The
operating agreement was ambiguous on the issue of whether cash would be
excluded from the definition of assets for purposes of triggering a dissolution
event, and therefore summary judgment was inappropriate. 163 Judge Benton
concurred in the reversal, but observed that after considering all evidence on
the point, the trial judge might very well again rule the same way. 4
Recent legislation modified the method of identifying limited liability
companies. 16' The only approved abbreviation or designation is now "LLC"
or "L.L.C." used as the last words of the name of every limited liability com-
pany. 166 "L.C." and "limited company" are no longer approved. 67 "Limited
Liability Company" and "Ltd. Liability Co."-or some combination of the
words and abbreviations-may still be used as the last words. 168 "The name
of the limited liability company must be distinguishable on the records of the
... Department of State" except they do not have to be distinguishable from
1) "fictitious name registrations filed pursuant to [section] 865.09" of the
Florida Statutes, and "general partnership registrations filed pursuant to [sec-
tion] 620.8105" of the Florida Statutes; or 2) when use of an indistinguish-
able name is consented to in writing by the "owner entity" and "filed with
the Department of State" at the time the limited liability company registers
its name.'69 Except for names falling within those exceptions, the Depart-
ment of State may no longer disregard other recorded names. 170
For limited liability companies formed before July 1, 2007, the distin-
guishability of names requirement will not apply unless and until that limited
liability company files documents after June 30, 2007, that affect its name. '71
159. Id.
160. O'Neal, 950 So. 2d at 426.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (Benton, J., concurring).
165. Act effective Jan. 1, 2008, ch. 2007-134, § 1, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1115, 1116-
17 (West) (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.406 (2007)).
166. Id. § 1, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1116 (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.406(1)(a)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.406(2)).
170. Ch. 2007-134, § 1, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1117 (amending FLA. STAT. §
608.406(3)).
171. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.406(4)).
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A conforming amendment was made to section 608.407 of the Florida
Statutes with respect to the name of the limited liability included in the arti-
cles of incorporation. 72
C. Partnerships
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in the context of a partnership dis-
solution, considered the issue of modification of the terms of a partnership
agreement by the subsequent conduct of the partners.'73 Rhodes entered into
a partnership agreement with BLP Associates, Inc. 7 4 The written general
partnership agreement provided that if money, in addition to the initial capi-
tal contributions, was necessary for partnership operations, "then such addi-
tional sums ... may be (but shall not be required to be) advanced as loans
from the Partners."' Rhodes, as managing partner, requested more money
from the partners, but he described his requests as "capital calls" and "capital
contributions."'' 76 The partners, including Rhodes, sent money, with one of
the other partners referring to the payment as a capital contribution. ' No
partner referred to these payments as loans, and no one objected to Rhodes'
characterization of the payments.'78 In addition, the partnership's federal
income tax returns for the pertinent years classified the additional contribu-
tions as capital contributions.'79 The partnership was eventually dissolved, a
receiver was appointed, and the receiver submitted a final accounting. '80 The
trial court determined that for the purpose of distributing partnership funds,
the additional contributions were capital contributions, not loans. 18'
Rhodes appealed, alleging that these contributions were loans.' 82 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal had no difficulty confirming the trial court's
ruling on the characterization of the payments as capital contributions.'83
The court observed that a written agreement can "be modified by the [later]
conduct or course of dealing of the parties," provided there is mutual consent
and consideration for the modification, even when the agreement purports to
172. Id. § 2, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1117 (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.407 (2007)).
173. Rhodes v. BLP Assocs., Inc., 944 So. 2d 527, 530 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
174. Id. at 528.
175. Id. at 529.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Rhodes, 944 So. 2d at 529.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 528.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 528-29.
183. See Rhodes, 944 So. 2d at 530.
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allow only written modification.'84 The court disagreed with Cox v. CSX
Intermodal, Inc."85 and Flagship National Bank v. Gray Distribution Sys-
tems, Inc. 8 6 to the extent that those cases suggested "that a written contract
cannot be modified by the subsequent course of conduct of the parties" if the
conduct is inconsistent with the terms of the agreement. 87 Furthermore, the
court noted that even if Cox stated the law correctly, the rule would be inap-
plicable.188  There was nothing inconsistent between the language of the
partnership provision at issue and the parties' subsequent conduct treating
the additional funds as capital contributions. 
89
A second issue in the case involved a loan by the other partners to Rho-
des that enabled Rhodes to make his initial capital contribution. 90 The
promissory note given by Rhodes to the other partners provided that the ob-
ligation matured when "capital contributions were 'paid in full.""9191  The
other partners persuaded the trial court to retain Rhodes' share of the partner-
ship capital distributions until their suit against him on the note was con-
cluded. 192 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed on this issue, find-
ing that neither the promissory note nor the partnership agreement provided
for this hold back. 19 The trial court was not permitted to aid the other part-
ners in the collection of debt in that manner. 94
D. Corporations and Shareholder/Buy-Sell Agreements
In Alvarez v. Rendon, 95 two pathologists formed a professional associa-
tion for the practice of medicine. 96 Dr. Rendon owned a slight majority of
the stock.' 97 The employment contract Dr. Alvarez subsequently signed pro-
vided that he could be terminated for cause and specified what would consti-
tute cause.' 98 His employment could also be terminated without cause, but in
that event, Dr. Alvarez would be entitled to notice and compensation during
184. Id.
185. 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
186. 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3dDist. Ct. App. 1986).
187. Rhodes, 944 So. 2d at 531.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 529.
191. Id.
192. Rhodes, 944 So. 2d at 531.
193. Id. at 532.
194. Id.
195. 953 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
196. Id. at 705.
197. Id. Rendon owned 51% and Alvarez owned 49% of the stock. Id.
198. Id.
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the notice period.199 The doctors also entered into a buy-sell agreement un-
der which Dr. Alvarez would be paid a specified sum for his shares in the
event of termination without cause, but would only receive half of that
amount in the event of termination for cause or his voluntary termination.00
The buy-sell agreement contained a noncompete provision effective upon
redemption of shares, but not conditioned on the reason for termination of
employment.2°1
Dr. Rendon, acting as the professional association's president, termi-
nated Dr. Alvarez's employment and attempted to begin making "for cause"
buy-out payments. 2  Dr. Alvarez did not accept the payments because he
claimed he was improperly fired for cause and therefore entitled to the lar-
ger-without cause-buy-out amount. 2 3 After Dr. Alvarez left the practice,
he began working in South Florida for a medical laboratory that had clients
in the geographic area specified in the noncompete clause.20 4
Dr. Alvarez sued Dr. Rendon and the professional association alleging
breach of the employment contract based on alleged improper termination
for cause and improper reduction of his salary.205 He also claimed that they
breached the buy-sell agreement.2 6 Dr. Rendon and the professional asso-
ciation counterclaimed, alleging breach of the noncompete provision by Dr.
Alvarez. 2 7 The jury found that Dr. Rendon was not justified in terminating
Dr. Alvarez for cause. 2 8 Dr. Alvarez was awarded the difference in the
amount Dr. Rendon tendered and the amount Dr. Alvarez would have re-
ceived for the buy-out without cause, plus damages based on the wrongful
termination for cause. 2 9 The jury also found that Dr. Alvarez was bound by,
and violated, the restrictive covenant. 2 0 The trial court awarded damages to
Dr. Rendon and granted her motion for a permanent injunction. 21 ' Dr. Alva-
rez appealed, and Dr. Rendon and the professional association cross-
appealed.212
199. Alvarez, 953 So. 2d at 705.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
203. Id.
204. Alvarez, 953 So. 2d at 705.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 706.
208. Id.
209. Alvarez, 953 So. 2d at 706.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 707. The effect of the monetary awards was a net judgment to the professional
association of $602,970.48. Id.
212. Id. at 708.
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, concluding
that the jury's verdict was inconsistent. 21  The jury could not have found
that Dr. Alvarez violated the noncompete clause if they also found that Dr.
Rendon's termination for cause was improper." 4 Since Dr. Alvarez was not
terminated for cause, he was entitled to a greater payment for his shares un-
der the agreement, and since that amount was not paid, and his shares were
not redeemed, his obligations under the noncompete clause could not have
arisen.2 5 The proper remedy for the inconsistent verdict was a new trial.2 16
However, in order to preserve the issue of inconsistency in the verdict for
review on appeal, the party alleging the inconsistency must have raised it
before the jury was discharged, which the Fifth District Court of Appeal con-
cluded that Dr. Alvarez did.217
In an unusual case, Henao v. Professional Shoe Repair, Inc.,218 it was
the buyer of a business who was prohibited from soliciting business from
existing customers of the business he was buying.2 9 The buyer and the
seller had been in business together, and their corporation had a very lucra-
tive contract with a customer.22° It was that relationship that formed the ba-
sis for the restrictive covenant and the litigation.2 1 The seller sold his equal
share of the business to the buyer, and the buyer assigned to the seller all of
the buyer's interest in the contract with the customer.222 The buyer also
agreed that he would not solicit that customer for ten years. 223 The seller
sought an injunction, alleging that the Buyer breached the covenant not to
compete.224 The trial court found that the covenant was void and unenforce-
able. 225 The Fifth District Court of Appeal was called upon to determine if
the provisions of section 542.335 of the Florida Statutes, with respect to
enforcement of restrictive covenants against a "seller," also apply to enforce
restrictive covenants against a buyer.226 Based on the purpose stated in the
statute to construe restrictive covenants in a manner that will provide "rea-
213. Alvarez, 953 So. 2d at 707, 713.
214. See id. at 710.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 712.
217. Id. at711.
218. 929 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
219. Id. at 725.
220. Id. at 724.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. Henao, 929 So. 2d at 724.
224. Id. at 724-25.
225. Id. at 725.
226. Henao, 929 So. 2d at 727; see also FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(d)(3) (1999).
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sonable protection to all legitimate business interests," the court concluded
that the provisions apply to buyers as well as sellers. 2 7 Furthermore, al-
though the duration of the restrictive covenant was in excess of seven years
and therefore presumptively unreasonable under section 542.335 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, the seller showed that the noncompete provision protected a
legitimate interest of the seller and the provision was therefore not void or
unenforceable. 28 The court had the authority to cut the agreement back to a
reasonable period of time.229 Another issue arose because the agreement
only gave the buyer the right to enforce the covenant, and it was the buyer
who was subject to the covenant.23° The court noted that was an obvious
misnaming of the parties and the seller could enforce the agreement.
31
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. Actions Based on Contract
Mr. and Mrs. Hodges were Indiana residents.232 They purchased a sec-
ond home in Florida in 1993 where they spent about five and one-half
months each year.233 Their automobile insurance was issued to them by
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (State Farm) in Indiana.23" During
their 2001 stay in Florida, Mr. and Mrs. Roach, the Hodges' neighbors, while
passengers in the Hodges' car, were involved in a crash with another car.
235
Mr. and Mrs. Roach were injured and they sued both Mr. Hodges, who was
driving the car, and the driver of the other car. 36 They also claimed unin-
sured motorist benefits under the Hodges' Indiana insurance policy.237 Be-
cause the Indiana and Florida uninsured motorist laws differed, the Roaches
could receive compensation under Florida law that they could not receive
under Indiana law. 238 The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that Florida
law could apply to the Indiana policy, provided that Florida had a "signifi-
cant connection" to the insurance policy, and State Farm had "reasonable
227. Henao, 929 So. 2d at 727 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(h)).
228. Id. at 728.
229. Id.
230. Id
231. Id.
232. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So. 2d 1160, 1168 (Fla. 2006).
233. Id. at 1162.
234. Id.
235. Id. Mrs. Hodges died in the accident. Id.
236. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1162.
237. Id.
238. See id.
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notice" of the Hodges' Florida connection. 239 The Second District Court of
Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to make this determination,240
and the question certified to the Supreme Court of Florida was restated by
the Supreme Court of Florida as follows: "Where residents of another state
who reside in Florida for several months of the year execute an insurance
contract in that state, may they invoke Florida's public policy exception to
the rule of lex loci contractus to invalidate an exclusionary clause in the pol-
icy?"
241
The Supreme Court of Florida said no, holding that the rule providing.
that the law of the place where the contract was made-lex loci contractus-
governs the insurance contract unless the public policy exception applies.242
In other words, lex loci contractus is the law in Florida, but a departure from
this rule can be made to enforce some paramount public policy with respect
to Florida citizens.243 The Hodges were not Florida citizens and that re-
solved the matter.2" Therefore, it was not necessary to determine if Indiana
law offended some paramount rule of Florida public policy.245 The court did
note, however, that in the context of insurance contracts, the exception ap-
plies only if the insurer had "reasonable notice that the insured is a Florida
citizen. 2 46 The Hodges' Indiana citizenship made that question moot. 247
Justice Pariente concurred, but stated that "if [she] were to write on a
clean slate, [she] would apply the 'significant relationship' test. 2 48 Justice
Pariente agreed that the result reached by the majority was required, absent
receding from the Court's precedent. 49 She concluded, however, that even
under the "significant relationship" test, Indiana law would have applied.250
Although this case did not arise in a business context, the Supreme
Court of Florida's continued rejection of the "most significant relationship"
test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, in contract cases, in-
239. Id. at 1163.
240. Id.
241. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1162.
242. Id. at 1164-65, 1168.
243. Id. at 1164-65.
244. Id. at 1168.
245. Id. at 1168-69.
246. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1165.
247. Id. at 1168. The opinion did not state if the Roaches were Florida citizens, or, if they
were, if that would have changed the result. See id. at 1168. It would seem that the Hodges
were third-party beneficiaries under the contract between the Hodges and State Farm Insur-
ance Company. See id. at 1162.
248. Id. at 1169 (Pariente, J., concurring).
249. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1169 (Pariente, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 1169-70.
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surance related, and otherwise, is significant.251 Justice Lewis, concurring in
the result only, noted that the majority was applying "the doctrine of lex loci
contractus in Florida more rigidly than ever before.2 52 Justice Lewis' dis-
cussion regarding Decker v. Great American Insurance Co.,253 a case involv-
ing a Georgia business with a Florida traveling salesman, makes a compel-
ling argument for adopting the "significant relationship" test.254
B. Tort Actions
The First District Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether the
"modified" comparative negligence law of Georgia or the "pure" compara-
tive negligence rule of Florida applied to a car accident in Georgia between
residents of Florida and Georgia. 255 The Florida resident, Mr. Connell, was
commuting from his home in Florida to a project on which he was working
in Georgia when his truck collided in Georgia with a compact car driven by
Caleb Riggins, the Georgia resident.256 Mr. Riggins was injured and he
brought an action in Florida against Mr. Connell.257 Mr. Connell filed a mo-
tion seeking a ruling that Georgia law applied with respect to all questions
related to negligence and damages.258 Under the Georgia rule, if the defen-
dant and plaintiff are found to be equally negligent, or the defendant's negli-
gence is less than the plaintiffs, then the plaintiff cannot recover from the
defendant.259 Mr. Riggins argued that Georgia law applied to some issues,
but that Florida's comparative negligence law applied.260 If Florida law ap-
plied, then liability would have been divided "according to each party's per-
centage of negligence. '2 6' The trial court found that Florida law applied to
those issues.262 After final judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Riggins,
Mr. Connell appealed, alleging, among other errors, that the trial court im-
properly applied Florida law to the issues of comparative negligence and
damages. 2
63
251. Id. at 1163-64; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
252. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1170-71 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
253. 392 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
254. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1173 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
255. Connell v. Riggins, 944 So. 2d 1174, 1176-77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
256. Id. at 1176.
257. Id. Mr. Connell's employer was also named as a defendant. Id.
258. Id. at 1178.
259. Connell, 944 So. 2d at 1177.
260. Id. at 1178.
261. Id. at 1177.
262. Id. at 1180.
263. Id. at 1176.
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The First District Court of Appeal relied heavily on Bishop v. Florida
Specialty Paint Co. 21 in concluding that Georgia law applied. 265 The court
observed that the Supreme Court of Florida, in Bishop, rejected the old lex
loci delicti rule in favor of the "significant relationship" test found in sec-
tions 145 and 146 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.266 Un-
der the "significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second), the ques-
tion is which state's law "has the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties under the principles" set forth in the Restatement (Sec-
ond).267 In making the choice of law, Bishop advises consideration of: "1)
'the place where the injury occurred,' 2) 'the place where the conduct caus-
ing the injury occurred,' 3) 'the domicil, residence, nationality, place of in-
corporation and place of business of the parties,' and 4) 'the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.' ' 268 "The state where
the injury occurred" will usually be the primary factor in resolving the con-
flict of law issue.269
Applying the four-factor test, the First District Court of Appeal held,
"[a]s a matter of law, Florida [did] not have a more significant relationship
than Georgia to the [event] and to the parties" and certainly not enough to
overcome the consideration that had to be given to Georgia as the place
where the injury occurred. 7°
V. CONSUMER RIGHTS
A. Telephone Solicitation and Telemarketing
In 2000, Cricket's Termite Control, Inc. (Cricket's) leased an automated
telemarketing system to use in offering pest control services to potential cus-
tomers.2 17 1 After Cricket's began using the system, it received a notice from
the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services that com-
plaints had been received that Cricket's was making automated sales solicita-
264. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
265. See Connell, 944 So. 2d at 1180.
266. Id. at 1177; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145-46
(1971).
267. Connell, 944 So. 2d at 1176.
268. Id. at 1177 (quoting Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla.
1980)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1180.
271. De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d 1001,
1002 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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tion calls in violation of section 501.059 of the Florida Statutes.272 Cricket's
was ordered to stop making calls in violation of the statute and advised that
failure to do so could result in an injunction against it and civil penalties of
as much as $10,000 per call.273 Cricket's not only immediately stopped mak-
ing such calls, it stopped making lease payments to the lessor of the system,
De Lage Landen Financial Services, Inc. (DLL).274 DLL sued Cricket's to
collect the lease payments.275 Cricket's defense was that the lease was illegal
and unenforceable because the intended use of the leased property turned out
to be illegal.2 76 The trial court agreed, refusing to enforce the lease, and
awarded Cricket's attorney's fees.277 DLL appealed and the Fifth District
Court of Appeal framed the issue as "whether the lease agreement is an en-
forceable contract, or if it is void for violating Florida Statutes or Florida
public policy. 278  The court determined that the lease violated neither.2 79
The lease agreement was purportedly governed by Oregon law. 280 The court
noted that Oregon's automated call statute is similar to the Florida statute.28'
Both statutes contain exceptions to the prohibition of automated calls so that
automated calling systems can be put to legal uses.282
The court, in reaching its decision, looked to a case with similar facts283
in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas concluded that just because an item
subject to a sales contract can be put to illegal uses does not render the con-
tract void.284 There are, however, two similar, although not identical, excep-
tions to this rule.285  Under the first exception, if a seller knows of the
buyer's illegal purpose and that illegal purpose "'involves the commission of
a serious crime or an act of great moral turpitude,"' the seller cannot enforce
272. Id. at 1002-03; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.059 (2007).
273. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1003.
274. Id. The lease, originally between Cricket's and U.S. Bancorp, was assigned to De
Lage Financial Services, Inc. Id. at 1002.
275. Id. at 1003.
276. Id.
277. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1003.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1005-06.
280. Id. at 1004 n.1.
281. Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 759.290 (2003).
282. See FLA. STAT. § 501.059 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 759.290 (2003).
283. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1004; see also Potomac Leasing Co. v.
Vitality Centers, Inc., 718 S.W.2d 928 (Ark. 1986).
284. Potomac Leasing Co., 718 S.W.2d at 929.
285. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1005-06. One exception is mentioned
in the body of the Cricket's decision, and the other is in a footnote. Id. at 1005, 1006 n.3.
2007]
25
Landau: 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
the contract. 286 The second exception applies when the seller of the product
knows that the buyer's use of the product will be a "'flagrant violation of the
fundamental rights of man and society." 287 The court in Cricket's found that
there was no indication that either "DLL or U.S. Bancorp, [the original les-
sor,] knew of Cricket's planned use of the System.288 Even if they had,
Cricket's use of the automated call system would have to have constituted a
"'flagrant violation of the fundamental rights of man and society' to void
the lease. 289
The court found additional reasons to reverse the trial court.290 Section
680.1031(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes and section 72A.1030 of the Oregon
Revised Statutes do not permit a finance lessee to refuse payments to the
finance lessor if the goods in question turn out not to be as expected.29 The
lessor's covenants to the finance lessee are also irrevocable and independent
of any defense the lessee may have against a third-party seller.292 Finally,
the court noted, with apparent approval, the finance lessor's broad boiler
plate liability disclaimers set out in the lease agreement.293
TSA Stores, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Ser-
vices, 294 also decided by the Fifth District Court of Appeal, raised several
questions of first impression. 295 As in Cricket's, section 501.059 of the Flor-
ida Statutes was involved.296 The Department alleged that TSA violated the
automated calling provisions and the do-not-call list rules.297 The parties
agreed that all of the calls originated from California.298 TSA had its princi-
286. Id. at 1005 (quoting Potomac Leasing Co., 718 S.W.2d at 930). The Arkansas court,
in turn, cited 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1519 (1962), in support of its
holding. Potomac Leasing Co., 718 S.W.2d at 929-30. Corbin notes that even "a fountain
pen can.., be used for... criminal purposes." 6A CORBIN, supra, § 1519.
287. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1006 n.3 (quoting Potomac Leasing
Co., 718 S.W.2d at 929).
288. Id.
289. Id. Although not stated in the opinion, it would seem that the Florida court agreed
with the Supreme Court of Arkansas that the Arkansas flagrant violation of human rights test
was "essentially the same" as the Corbin serious crime or moral turpitude test. See Potomac
Leasing Co., 718 S.W.2d at 929-30.
290. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1006.
291. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 680.1031(1)(g) (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 72A.4070 (2003).
292. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1006 (citing FLA. STAT. § 680.407
(2007); OR. REv. STAT. § 72A.4070 (2003)).
293. Id. at 1006-07.
294. 957 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
295. Id at 26.
296. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.059 (2004).
297. TSA Stores, Inc., 957 So. 2d at 26.
298. Id. at 30. The court noted that the automated calling provisions of the statute do not
contain a preexisting relationship provision. Id.
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pal place of business in Broward County, Florida, and the calls were made to
people in Orange County, Florida, inviting them to a sale at TSA stores in
Orange County.299 TSA raised several defenses, including that the Federal
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) preempted section 501.059 of
the Florida Statutes.3" The court easily dismissed this argument because the
TCPA expressly provides that it does not preempt state law.3' 1 Another issue
was the interpretation of an exception to the do-not-call list rules that allow a
telephone solicitor to call persons on the list with whom the solicitor "'has a
prior or existing business relationship,' 3 2 a phrase not defined by the stat-
ute.3°3 TSA argued that the persons who were alleged to have been improp-
erly called all consented to telephone solicitations by providing a telephone
number to the sales clerks.3" The court found that this did not constitute
express consent, which is required by the statute, although it might be im-
plied consent. 35 The court looked for guidance to the definition applicable
under the TCPA of "established business relationship. 30 6 Relying on that
definition, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that if a person made
a purchase from TSA within eighteen months prior to the telephone solicita-
tion, solicitation was permissible, even to persons on the do-not-call list.307
With respect to the automated calls, TSA argued that Florida had no au-
thority to regulate interstate calls that originated in California.3 8 The court
concluded that it did not need to address the issue of jurisdiction over calls
emanating from outside of Florida, since these calls were otherwise covered
by section 501.059 of the Florida Statutes.3 09 The Florida provisions prevent
a person from simply taking the automated machines out of Florida and call-
ing consumers in Florida, as a way of avoiding the statute.310 The Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that the causation underlying this statutory viola-
tion involved a business in Orange County, Florida, Orange County consum-
299. Id. at 26.
300. Id.
301. TSA Stores, Inc., 957 So. 2d. at 28 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (2000)).
302. Id. at 27.
303. Id. at 29.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. TSA Stores, Inc., 957 So. 2d at at 29-30 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) (2006)).
307. Id. at 30.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
2007]
27
Landau: 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LAW REVIEW
ers, and a sale being held in Orange County. 31 The court concluded that the
place from which the calls originated was irrelevant "in this context.,
312
There were two prohibitions added to Florida's telephone solicitation
statute in 2006.313 The first prohibition makes it unlawful, with limited ex-
ceptions, for telephone sales solicitors to fail to disclose their names and tel-
ephone numbers.3t 4 The second prohibition makes it unlawful to alter voices
with intent to defraud or confuse.315
B. Deceptive Trade Practices
In South Motor Co. of Dade County v. Doktorcyk,316 Doktorczyk
brought an action against South Motors under the Florida Deceptive and Un-
fair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). 317 He claimed that when he purchased a
used car, "South Motors misrepresented that the factory warranty . . . had
expired" and persuaded him to buy an extended warranty.318 The alleged
misrepresentations were made almost six years before Doktorczyk filed his
action.319  Section 95.11(3)(f) of the Florida Statutes imposed a four year
statute of limitations for FDUTPA claims and other statutory causes of ac-
tion.320
Doktorczyk claimed that under section 95.05 1(1)(f) of the Florida Stat-
utes, the statute of limitations was tolled by the installment payments he
made for five years on the auto extended warranty purchase. 32' This section
states that the statute of limitations is tolled by "payment of any part of the
principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written in-
strument. 32  The Third District Court of Appeal held that Doktorcyzk's
claim was founded on a statutory cause of action, not on a written instru-
ment, and therefore his action was filed too late.
3 23
311. TSA Stores, Inc., 957 So. 2d at 31.
312. Id.
313. FLA. STAT. § 501.059(7)(c), (d) (2007).
314. Id. § 501.059(7)(c).
315. Id. § 501.059(7)(d).
316. 957 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
317. Id. at 1216.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1216-17 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(f) (Supp. 1996)).
321. SeeDoktorczyk, 957 So. 2d at 1217.
322. FLA. STAT. § 95.05 1(1)(f) (2004).
323. Doktorczyk, 957 So. 2d at 1217-18.
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In another FDUTPA case, the Florida Attorney General, on behalf of
small businesses, sued several leasing companies.324 The trial court found
that certain telecommunications equipment leases were not "consumer leas-
es" because under the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, section
680.1031(e) of the Florida Statutes, they were not considered "consumer
leases., 32" The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was
error for the trial court to have relied on a statute other than the FDUTPA,
since the FDUTPA contains its own definition of consumer, which is not
limited to "personal, family or household purposes. 326
C. Warranties
The Supreme Court of Florida was asked if an automobile lessee is enti-
tled, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Magnuson-Moss),327 to en-
force auto warranties.328 The Second District Court of Appeal, having said
yes, certified conflict between its decision and the First District Court of Ap-
peal's decision in Sellers v. Frank Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc.,329 to the con-
trary.330 In Cerasani, Jennifer Cerasani leased a Honda Civic on a long-term
lease basis. 33 ' She had problems with the automobile. 332 Unsuccessful at-
tempts were made to repair the car, and Cerasani eventually sued the manu-
facturer, American Honda, under Magnuson-Moss for breach of written war-
ranty and breach of implied warranty.333 The trial court dismissed her com-
plaint finding that the written warranty defined in Magnuson-Moss applied to
automobile purchasers only, not to lessees. 334 The trial court also found "that
Cerasani was not in privity of contract with Honda, as required" for an im-
plied contract claim. 35 Cerasani appealed and the Second District Court of
Appeal affirmed the dismissal of her claim with respect to the implied war-
ranty, but reversed the dismissal of the express new-car warranty claim under
324. State v. Commerce Commercial Leasing, LLC, 946 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2007).
325. Id. at 1258.
326. Id.
327. 15 U.S.C. § 2301-12 (2000).
328. Am. Honda Motor Co., v. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2007).
329. 526 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
330. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d at 544.
331. Id. at 545.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d at 545.
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Magnuson-Moss.33 6 It was the reversal that conflicted with Sellers. The
Supreme Court of Florida held that an automobile lessee is entitled to en-
force auto warranties under Magnuson-Moss.337 The court also held that the
narrow definition of "written warranty" contained in Magnuson-Moss yields
to the broader definition under state law, specifically section 681.102(23) of
the Florida Statutes, the Lemon Law.338
Magnuson-Moss, according to the Supreme Court of Florida, was de-
signed "to enhance the enforceability of warranties on consumer products
and protect the 'ultimate user of the product.' ' 339 Nevertheless, only a "con-
sumer" may sue under Magnuson-Moss.34 The court noted that three cate-
gories of consumers are identified in Magnuson-Moss. 34' They are: 1) a
buyer, as long as not bought for resale; 2) anyone to whom the consumer
product is transferred while the warranty or service contract is in effect; or 3)
"any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service
contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or
service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract). 342
The court placed Cerasani in the third category finding that under Florida's
Lemon Law, auto lessees are entitled to enforce auto warranties.343
D. Consumer Report Security Freeze
In 2006, Florida enacted a "consumer report security freeze" statute,
section 501.005 of the Florida Statutes, to allow a consumer to place a "se-
curity freeze" on his or her credit report. 34 The term "security freeze" refers
to "a notice placed in a consumer report that prohibits a consumer reporting
agency" from releasing specified consumer information without express au-
thorization of the consumer.345 A consumer's request for a security freeze is
made by a request in writing sent by certified mail to a consumer credit re-
porting agency.3 46 Except as otherwise provided by the numerous exceptions
336. Id.
337. Id. at 549.
338. Id. at 548-49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 681.102(23) (2006)).
339. Id. at 545.
340. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d at 546.
341. Id.
342. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (2000).
343. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d at 548-49.
344. Act effective July 1, 2006, ch. 2006-124, §1, 2006 Fla. Laws 1621, 1621 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 501.005(1) (2007)). The meaning of the term "consumer report" is the same as
contained in 45 U.S.C. § 168 la(d). Id.
345. FLA. STAT. § 501.005(1) (2007).
346. Id. § 501.005(2)(a).
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contained in the statute,34 7 the consumer's credit report cannot be released
without the consumer's consent.348 The freeze can last indefinitely.349 The
reporting agency can make it known to a third-party that a freeze has been
put on the information. 5° The reporting agency may charge a fee of not
more than ten dollars for the initial freeze, for a temporary freeze or removal
of the freeze, and for the permanent removal of the freeze. 351' However, no
fee for an initial placement or for removal of a freeze may be charged to a
consumer who is at least sixty-five years old.352 Violation of this law may
result in an award of actual damages, costs, and attorneys fees, and in certain
cases, punitive damages.353
E. Gift Certificates
In 2007, legislation was enacted that affects credit memos and gift cer-
tificates. 35 Under the new section 501.95 of the Florida Statutes, gift cer-
tificates and credit memos sold in Florida generally "may not have an expira-
tion date, expiration period, or any type of post-sale charge or fee... [such
as] service charges, dormancy fees, account maintenance fees, or cash-out
fees. 355 Definitions of "credit memo" and "gift certificate" are provided.356
If there is no consideration provided, the rule does not apply.357 Some ex-
ceptions are provided.358 For example, gift certificates that are charitable
contributions may have an expiration date (of atleast three years) provided
"the expiration date is prominently disclosed in writing to the consumer."' 359
An expiration date is also permitted where a gift certificate is issued as part
of an event of limited duration, such as a conference or vacation, provided
that most of the consideration paid by the recipient of the gift certificate is
347. E.g., id § 501.005(8), (12).
348. Id. § 501.005(1).
349. Seeid. § 501.005(11).
350. FLA. STAT. § 501.005(1).
351. Id. § 501.005(13).
352. Id. § 501.005(13)(b)(1).
353. Id. § 501.005(16)(a)-(c), (e).
354. Id. §§ 501.95, 717.1045. Section 717.1045 of the Florida Statutes deals with gift
certificates and credit memos from the standpoint of the unclaimed property statute. FLA.
STAT. § 717.1045 (2007).
355. Id. § 501.95(2)(a).
356. Id. § 501.95(1)(a), (b).
357. See id. § 501.95(2)(a).
358. Id.
359. FLA. STAT. § 501.95(2)(a).
2007]
31
Landau: 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
for the event, not the gift certificate.36 ° There are also exceptions to these
prohibitions for certain state-chartered banks and credit unions."6
VI. CONTRACTS
A. Formation
Hammond owned real estate in Indian River County.362 He and DSY
Developers, LLC., having its principal place of business in Miami-Dade
County, negotiated for several months over the sale and purchase of Ham-
mond's land.363 There were offers and counteroffers and on November 11,
2004, DSY made another counteroffer and tendered a $25,000 deposit that
required acceptance by Hammond by November 25, 20 04 .364 Hammond
changed the acceptance date for the contract to December 10, 2004, and
mailed his counteroffer back to DSY on December 15, 2004.365 On January
12, 2005, DSY faxed its acceptance in the form of an executed contract to
Hammond.3 66 Hammond refused to proceed with the deal on the grounds
that the contract was void because DSY did not accept by December 10,
2004.36' DSY sued Hammond in the Circuit Court in Miami-Dade County
seeking specific performance. 36' The trial court ruled that a contract had
been formed and ordered Hammond to convey title to the property to
DSY.3 69 The trial court's order also provided that the order would convey
title if Hammond did not comply with the contract.370
On Hammond's appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal noted that
the case presented an issue of first impression of "whether a deadline for
accepting an offer may be waived by delivering the offer after the deadline
has passed.,, 371 The question presented to the Third District Court of Appeal
was whether Hammond, by not mailing the offer (counteroffer) until Decem-
ber 15, 2004,-after the date he had provided in his counteroffer for accep-
360. Id
361. See id. § 501.95(2)(b).
362. Hammond v. DSY Developers, LLC., 951 So. 2d 985, 987 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
363. See id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Hammond, 951 So. 2d at 987.
368. See id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 988.
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tance had passed-waived the requirement that the contract be accepted by a
certain date.3 72 The Third District Court of Appeal said yes and found, as a
matter of law, that Hammond's late mailing of the offer was an "implied
waiver" of the provision.3 73 Furthermore, since the offer was then without an
acceptance deadline, a "reasonable time" for acceptance would be implied.374
The Third District Court of Appeal found as a matter of law, based on the
undisputed dealings between the parties, that acceptance by January 12,
2005, was within a reasonable time, considering the Christmas holidays.
3 75
The trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of DSY and
directing specific performance by Hammond was approved, but only to the
extent it did not operate as a mandate transferring title.3 76 The Third District
Court of Appeal noted that the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over
the parties in a suit for specific performance under a real estate contract.
377
However, the trial court did not have in rem jurisdiction over the property
located in Indian River County.3 78 Citing the "local action rule," the Third
District Court of Appeal stated that if a court does not have in rem jurisdic-
tion over the real property involved in the action, then the court does not
have jurisdiction to convey title.379 Therefore, if court action became neces-
sary to enforce the order and to transfer title, then it would be necessary to
transfer the case to the court having in rem jurisdiction, that court being the
Circuit Court for Indian River County.38 °
In another offer and acceptance case, Polk v. BHRGU Avon Properties,
LLC,381 the Second District Court of Appeal considered whether offers, over-
lapping counteroffers, counter-counteroffers, counter-counter-counteroffers,
a failure to reject counteroffers, and an alleged option contract resulted in the
formation of a contract.382 The facts were that Polk listed real estate for sale
and on January 24, 2005, BHRGU Avon Properties, LLC. (Avon), offered to
purchase Polk's real estate.383 Polk made counteroffers on February 2, 2005,
and February 3, 2005." 4 The counteroffers both provided that Avon's dead-
372. Hammond, 951 So. 2d at 987-88.
373. Id. at 988.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 989.
377. Hammond, 951 So. 2d at 989.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. 946 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
382. See generally id.
383. Id. at 1121-22.
384. Id. at 1122.
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line for acceptance of Polk's counteroffer and delivery of the acceptance was
5:00 p.m. on February 7, 2005.385 Another offer was made by Avon to Polk
on February 4.386 That offer changed the material terms of Polk's counterof-
fers.387 However, before the February 7, 2005, deadline, Avon signed and
delivered both of Polk's counteroffers, and a $25,000 check was provided to
Polk's attorney as a deposit., 388 Although the attorney took the check, it was
not deposited, and, eventually, the attorney marked it "VOID." '389 Polk re-
fused to perform under the terms of her February 2 and February 3 counter-
offers, and Avon sought and was granted an order of specific performance.39
Polk appealed, arguing that there was never a contract formed for the
court to enforce.39' Avon argued that Polk's two counteroffers were, in fact,
options to purchase the property, and the options were duly and timely exer-
cised.392 The Second District Court agreed with Polk and reversed the trial
court. 
3 9 3
An option contract requires consideration and there was none. 394 The
$25,000 check was clearly consideration for the purchase of the property, not
for the purchase of an option. 395 The sequence of events as seen by the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal was: 1) offer by Avon; 2) counteroffers by
Polk which served to reject Avon's offer; and 3) a second offer by Avon
which served to reject Polk's counteroffers.396 Since Avon's second offer
was not accepted, there was no contract.397
In Alterra Healthcare Corp., the arbitration case discussed earlier in this
survey, Betsy Bryant argued that there was no signed written agreement that
required arbitration with respect to her stay in the second facility.398 Appar-
ently the residency agreements for the second facility were virtually identical
to the residency agreement for the first facility that had been signed by Betsy
Bryant's husband, as her attorney-in-fact. 399 The Fourth District Court of
385. Id.
386. Polk, 946 So. 2d at 1122.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Polk, 946 So. 2d at 1122.
392. See id at 1123.
393. Id. at 1125.
394. Id. at 1122-23.
395. Id. at 1123.
396. See Polk, 946 So. 2d at 1122-23.
397. Id. at 1125.
398. Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Bryant, 937 So. 2d 263, 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
399. SeeAlterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 270-71.
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Appeal noted that Mr. Bryant had been given a residency agreement to sign
for the second facility, but he did not get around to signing it.4 0 Neverthe-
less, the Fourth District Court of Appeal did not disturb the trial court's find-
ing that the Bryants and Alterra performed under the terms of one signed
agreement at both facilities; therefore, the first residency agreement was ap-
plicable to the second residence as well.4 °1
The First District Court of Appeal, in De Vaux v. Westwood Baptist
Church,"2 was called upon to determine if a contract existed after the trial
court dismissed with prejudice, the purported purchaser's complaint for spe-
cific performance. 43 The facts showed that by letter dated May 19, 2005, De
Vaux offered to purchase certain real estate from Westwood for $535,000.4 04
The letter set out several terms and conditions including Westwood taking
back a mortgage from De Vaux with interest at a specified sum to be paid
quarterly. 405 The letter stated that "[t]his contract will take precedent until a
more detailed legal contract can be drawn up stating terms, conditions, dates
and financing., 406  A church meeting was held six days later."4 7  At the
meeting, the sale of the property to De Vaux was approved. 48 The minutes
noted the approval and also stated that the church trustees were "authorized
to work out all the details" with De Vaux. 40 9 The First District Court of Ap-
peal noted that the plaintiff did not allege that the church trustees communi-
cated to him its "acceptance of his offer or the terms of the 'details' [of the
deal still] to be worked out., 410 The First District Court of Appeal held that
there was no contract to enforce.4 It is fundamental that "acceptance of the
offer must be communicated to the offeror.' '412 Furthermore, even if accep-
tance had been communicated, the essential terms of the agreement had not
been negotiated and there was "no meeting of the minds., 413 The court af-
400. Id. at 271. It is not stated in the opinion if the second residency agreement was
signed by a representative on behalf of Alterra. See generally id.
401. Id.
402. 953 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
403. Id. at 681.
404. Id. at 680.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. De Vaux, 953 So. 2d at 680.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 682.
412. De Vaux, 953 So. 2d at 682 (citing Kendel v. Pontious, 261 So. 2d 167, 169-70 (Fla.
1972)).
413. Id. at 681.
2007]
35
Landau: 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
firmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and
remanded for a determination of appellate attorney's fees to Westwood.414
An interesting aspect of the case was Westwood's motion on appeal for
an award, pursuant to section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes, of appellate
attorney fees.415 The court stated that with respect to the new statutory "'not
supported by the material facts or would not be supported by application of
then-existing law to those material facts' standard" that replaced the old
"'frivolous' standard, ... an all encompassing definition ... defies us."4 6
However, the court found it clear that there has been a lowering of the statu-
tory bar for the imposition of this sanction.' 17 The court determined that De
Vaux's complaint and appeal were "wholly without merit," and thus, subject
to sanction under either standard.418 The court observed that once the re-
quirements of section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes are satisfied, the court is
required "to award fees to the prevailing party in equal amounts to be paid by
the losing party and the losing party's attorney., 4 19 The matter was re-
manded for determination of the amount of the award of appellate attorney
fees.
420
B. Modification
Hadden and the radio station WSOS made an agreement in 1998 giving
Hadden the exclusive right to sell the radio station for a 5% commission.42'
The agreement provided for termination by either party on thirty days prior
written notice to the other.422 The listing agreement provided that the agree-
ment would remain in effect indefinitely absent such termination.423 Hadden
was entitled to his commission not only if the radio station was sold during
the term of the agreement, but also in two other situations.424 One situation
was if Hadden presented an offer that satisfied the asking price and terms but
the station declined the offer.4 25 The other situation would apply if WSOS
414. Id. at 685.
415. Id. at 682-85; see also FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (2007).
416. De Vaux, 953 So. 2d at 683 n.6.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 684.
419. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1).
420. De Vaux, 953 So. 2d at 685.
421. WSOS-FM, Inc. v. Hadden, 951 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
422. Id. The termination provision could not be used for the first 180 days of the agree-
ment. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Hadden, 951 So. 2d at 62.
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entered into an agreement to sell the station within twenty-four months after
the termination of the agreement, if the sale was to a buyer solicited by Had-
den.426 In September 2002, Hadden sent a fax to the WSOS station manager
to advise him that Hadden had a potential buyer for $3,500,000.47 The sta-
tion manager sent a letter to Hadden the day he received the fax in which he
took the position that the listing agreement between Hadden and WSOS had
been cancelled during a telephone conversation between Hadden and the
manager two years earlier.428 Hadden wrote back that the agreement had not
been cancelled two years earlier, but he would agree to treat the station man-
ager's letter as a thirty day notice of termination of the agreement. 429 WSOS
was sold for $4,000,000 about nine months later. 430 Hadden sued to collect
his 5% commission.431 The trial court found in favor of Hadden and WSOS
appealed.432
The Fifth District Court of Appeal, like the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal in the Rhodes case,433 relied on Pan American Engineering Co. v. Pon-
cho's Construction Co. 4 34 in stating that written agreements prohibiting later
oral modifications can nevertheless be modified orally. 435 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal noted that such agreements can be modified orally only
when modification "has been accepted and acted upon in such a manner that
refusing to enforce it would constitute fraud upon either party. 436 The court
reversed and remanded because it could not tell if the trial judge ruled that
the oral modification was invalid due to the writing requirement or that there
was no oral modification and termination in 2000. 4 37
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 62-63.
430. Hadden, 959 So. 2d at 63. The opinion does not state that the sale was to a buyer
Hadden had solicited or indicate upon which of the two grounds Hadden based his claim. See
id.
431. Id. at 63.
432. Id.
433. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. In Rhodes, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal considered whether a written agreement could "be modified by the subsequent con-
duct of the parties." Rhodes v. BLP Assocs., Inc., 944 So. 2d 527, 530 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006). The court in Rhodes noted that mutual assent and consideration are required for such
modification. Id.
434. 387 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
435. Hadden, 951 So. 2d at 63 (citing Pan Am. Eng'g Co. v. Poncho's Constr. Co., 387
So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
436. Id. at 63-64 (citing Prof I Ins. Corp. v. Cahill, 90 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1956)).
437. Id. at 64.
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C. Remedies
In Ocean Communications, Inc. v. Bubeck,43 plaintiffs entered into a
contract with defendant whereby defendant would provide advertising re-
lated services.439 Plaintiffs sought damages and restitution of amounts paid
under the contract, alleging breach of contract. 440 The trial court found there
were breaches of contract by the defendant, but that restitution is an equitable
remedy that is not available when there was an actual contract between the
parties. 44' The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in reversing and remanding
the case, discussed damages, restitution, and specific performance, the three
remedies the court noted are available for breach of contract." 2 The first,
damages, is intended to put the non-breaching party in as good a position as
that party would have been in had the contract been performed." 3 The sec-
ond, restitution, requires the breaching party to give back what that party
received because this tends to put the non-breaching party in as good a posi-
tion as that party "occupied before the contract was made."444 Restitution is
available as a remedy for breach of an express contract. 445 However, in this
case, because restitution was sought, plaintiff was required to return to de-
fendant the value, if any, of defendant's part performance."16 The court,
therefore, remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing as to the value of
defendant's services to be used to offset the restitution award to plaintiff."7
In Key v. Trattmann,448 Key sought specific performance of an alleged
oral agreement by Trattmann to convey real estate or the imposition of a re-
sulting trust, and summary judgment was granted in favor of Trattmann. 449
On appeal-for purposes of determining whether the motion was properly
granted by the trial court-the First District Court of Appeal "[took] as true"
the allegations that "to help Mr. Trattmann obtain United States' citizenship"
438. 956 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
439. Id. at 1224.
440. Id. The claim for restitution was originally based on unjust enrichment, which the
Fourth District Court of Appeal noted is not an available cause of action when there is an
express contract. Id. But the trial court had permitted the plaintiff to amend its complaint to
conform to the evidence by changing the claim from a claim for unjust enrichment seeking
restitution to a claim for breach of contract seeking restitution. Id. at 1226.
441. Bubeck, 956 So. 2d at 1224.
442. Id. at 1225.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Bubeck, 956 So. 2d at 1226.
447. Id.
448. 959 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
449. Id. at 341.
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the following occurred: 1) Key purchased real estate in Tallahassee; 2) Key
provided all of the consideration for the purchase and upkeep of the property;
3) Trattmann promised to convey the property to Key upon demand, but
when demand was made, refused to convey; and 4) there was no written
agreement between Key and Trattmann with respect to the property.45° In
the trial court, Key argued that a resulting trust had arisen and that he was the
beneficiary. 45 The trial court found that Florida's four year statute of limita-
tions under section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes applied and that Florida's
statute of frauds contained in section 689.01 of the Florida Statutes also ap-
plied.452
The First District Court of Appeal reversed, observing that a resulting
trust arises by operation of law. 453 The statute of frauds applies to actions
arising from a contract. 454 Therefore, the statute of frauds does not apply to a
resulting trust claim. 455 A resulting trust claim involving real estate can be
proven by oral testimony.4 56 The lack of a written contract was not fatal to
Trattmann's case.457 The court noted that with respect to the application of
the statute of limitations, it was not clear from the record when the statute
might first be said to have begun to run.458 That would have been when
Trattmann repudiated the trust or held the property adversely with Key's
knowledge. 459 The court found that Key's allegations fit the definition of a
resulting trust as set forth in Steigman v. Danese, 460 where it was stated that
"where a person furnishes money to purchase property in the name of an-
other, with both parties intending at the time that the legal title be held by the
named grantee for the benefit of the unnamed purchaser of the property. 461
The First District Court of Appeal gave Key a chance to prove his allegations
and, presumably gave the trial court the opportunity to revisit the statute of
limitations defense.462
450. Id. at 341-342.
451. Id. at 342.
452. Id. at 342, 344, 346 n.4; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 95.11, 689.01 (2007).
453. Key, 959 So. 2d at 345.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. See id.
457. Id.
458. Key, 959 So. 2d at 345-46.
459. Id. at 346.
460. 502 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
461. Key, 959 So. 2d at 342-43 (quoting Steigman v. Danese, 502 So. 2d 463, 467 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
462. Id. at 346.
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The next three cases deal with liquidated damages. The first two in-
volved real estate contracts and the third arose in the context of an alleged
breach of a noncompete agreement.463
In the first case, Hot Developers, Inc. v. Willow Lake Estates, Inc.,
464
the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed a summary judgment that al-
lowed a seller of commercial real estate to retain deposits of $550,000 as
liquidated damages. 465 The buyer claimed that allowing the seller to retain
the deposit was improper because the forfeiture amounted to an unenforce-
able penalty and was unconscionable.466 Hot Developers, Inc., as purchaser,
had entered into an agreement with Willow Lake to buy real estate for
$5,700,000.467 The contract was not conditioned upon Hot Developers ob-
taining financing, and time was stated to be of the essence.468 Hot Develop-
ers made the first deposit of $100,000, which would be refunded if Hot De-
velopers cancelled the contract for any reason within a "due diligence" pe-
riod.469 After that period expired, Hot Developers, not having cancelled the
contract, made a $200,000 deposit in accordance with the contract.47° It was
apparently only then that Hot Developers had problems with an appraisal and
asked for an extension of the original closing date. 47' The contract also pro-
vided that if Hot Developers extended the closing date, it would pay "an ad-
ditional non-refundable deposit" of $250,000.472 That amount was paid, and
unlike the first two deposits, the contract called for immediate distribution of
that money to Willow Lake to be credited against the purchase price. 473 Hot
Developers was unable to close on the first extended closing date.474 Be-
cause there was no provision in the agreement regarding another extension,
the parties signed an addendum to the agreement for a short additional exten-
sion date, which provided that Hot Developers agreed to the release as nonre-
fundable deposits of the first two deposits that were being held in escrow.475
463. See Hot Developers, Inc. v. Willow Lake Estates, Inc., 950 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); Burzee v. Park Ave. Ins. Agency, Inc., 946 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); Bradley v. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
464. 950 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
465. Id. at 539.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 538.
468. Id.
469. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 538.
470. Id. Unlike the initial deposit, apparently the contract was silent with respect to refund
of the $200,000 deposit. See id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 538.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 538-39.
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Hot Developers failed to close on the second extended date, and Willow
Lake exercised its option under the contract to terminate the contract and
retain the $550,000 as "liquidated and agreed damages. 4 76 The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal noted that it has been held that it is not unreasonable for
a payment to be required in exchange for an extended closing.477 However,
when that deposit will be forfeited if closing does not occur, forfeiture may
amount to "an unenforceable penalty in certain circumstances., 478 The court
agreed with Willow Lake that, as a matter of contract interpretation, the
funds were not refundable.479
The remaining issue was whether the forfeiture was a penalty.4 80 That
required a Hyman v. Cohen481 "liquidated damages analysis" based on the
circumstances that existed when the contract was made. 482 The provisions
will be upheld under Hyman v. Cohen if the damages were not then "readily
ascertainable ' 483 and the amount of the liquidated damages were not "grossly
disproportionate''44 to what seller's damages might be, unless enforcement
would be unconscionable. 485 The court concluded that the deposit amount,
being under 10% of the purchase price, was "well within the range of liqui-
dated damages approved by Florida courts., 486 Both parties to the transac-
tion were commercial entities with no apparent difference in bargaining
power between them. 48 7 The remaining question then was whether, based on
circumstances existing at the time of the breach, equity required a finding
that the liquidated damages, although not unenforceable penalties, were nev-
ertheless unconscionable.4 88 The court concluded that there also was nothing
to support a finding of unconscionability.48 9 This analysis included, in part, a
comparison of the forfeiture amount to the contract price, similar to the test
applied in determining if a forfeiture is an unenforceable penalty. 490 The
476. Id. at 539.
477. Id. (citing Waksman Enters., Inc. v. Or. Props., Inc., 862 So. 2d 35, 41 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2003)).
478. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 539 (quoting Waksman Enters., Inc., 862 So. 2d
at 42).
479. Id. at 540.
480. See id. at 539-40.
481. 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
482. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 540.
483. Id. (quoting Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d 129, 132 (Fla. 1972)).
484. Id. (quoting Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393, 401 (Fla. 1954)).
485. Id.
486. Id. at 541.
487. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 540-41.
488. Id. at 541.
489. Id.
490. Id. n.2.
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court cited cases where liquidated damages of 50% and 55% of the contract
price were unconscionable, but others with forfeitures of 18.2% and 22%
were upheld.49 1 The court also noted that the fact that the value of the prop-
erty had appreciated in value over the relevant period did not make the liqui-
dated damages unconscionable.492 In Bruce Builders, Inc. v. Goodwin,4 93 a
seller was entitled to liquidated damages even though the seller found an-
other buyer and made a net profit of about $2500. 414
In Bradley v. Sanchez,495 the Bradleys entered into a written agreement
with Mr. Sanchez on December 4, 2002, to purchase a home from Mr. San-
chez for $10,500,000.496 The agreement was contingent on the Bradleys
obtaining financing for 50% of the purchase price, with application to be
made by December 9, 2002. 49' The Bradleys paid a "deposit of $10,000 on
November 27, 2002," and were required to make an additional deposit of
$500,000 on December 20, 2002.498 The closing was originally set for
March 1, 2003, but at Mr. Sanchez's request, the executed contract provided
for a June 2, 2003, closing. 499 The contract stated that binding modifications
to it had to be written and signed.500
The buyers delayed in applying for financing.5"' They claimed that the
seller's agent told them on December 17, 2002, that they could wait until
closer to closing to apply for a loan.50 2 The agent claimed she never said
that, and denied having the authority to say that.50 3 "On December 12, 2002,
the [buyers] were served with a federal search warrant" which they claimed
made the requirement that they apply for a loan moot.5°4 They argued that
they would have been required to disclose to the bank the facts of the federal
investigation, which would have made it impossible for them to qualify "for
a large home mortgage." 505 On December 20, 2002, the Bradleys tried to
491. Id. at 541-42.
492. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 542.
493. 317 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The liquidated damages were 4.1% of
the contract price. Id. at 870. It would seem that a combination of the forfeiture percentage
and a profit on sale might lead to a different result in an appropriate case. See id.
494. Id.
495. 943 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
496. Id. at 220.
497. See id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 220.
501. Id. As it turned out, they never applied. See id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 220.
505. Id.
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cancel the contract and demanded the return of the $10,000 deposit.51 6 Mr.
Sanchez refused and demanded the $500,000 additional deposit due that
day. °7 The Bradleys sued for the return of the $10,000.8 Mr. Sanchez
filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract. 09 Mr. Sanchez asked to
keep the $10,000 deposit and for payment of the $500,000 deposit. 50 Mr.
Sanchez moved for summary judgment on his breach of contract counter-
claim.5 ' His motion was granted by the court and a final judgment was en-
tered awarding him both the $10,000 and the $500,000 deposits plus pre-
judgment interest.5 1 The Bradleys moved to amend their complaint before
final judgment was entered to allege that Mr. Sanchez sold the house on
April 18, 2005 for $10,400,000 and was therefore unjustly enriched.5"3 The
trial court denied the motion, and the Bradleys appealed.51 4 The Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that "there were no genuine issues of
material fact."5 5 The events upon which the buyers relied to excuse their
failure to apply for financing took place after the time to apply for the loan
had passed.1 6 Any waiver of the financing provision was required to have
been in writing.1 7 The court noted that it was aware that under certain cir-
cumstances, a later oral modification of a written contract would be upheld,
but none of those circumstances were present. 8 The court also found that
the liquidated damages amount of 4.85% of the contract price was neither an
impermissible penalty nor unconscionable.1 9
In Burzee v. Park Avenue Insurance Agency, Inc.,52° Ms. Burzee entered
into a written noncompete agreement with her then employer, Park Avenue
Insurance Agency, Inc.521 The agreement provided that for two years after
her employment ended, she would not communicate with any customers of
Park Avenue Insurance Agency, Inc. who were customers during her period
506. Id. at 220-21.
507. Id. at 221.
508. Id.
509. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 221.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at221-22.
514. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 220.
515. Id. at 221.
516. Id.
517. Id. at222.
518. Id.
519. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 222.
520. 946 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
521. Id. at 1201. Her employment contract was not in writing. Id.
43
Landau: 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
of employment. 522 The agreement also contained an agreed measure of dam-
ages clause if Ms. Burzee breached the agreement. 23 Park Avenue Insur-
ance Agency, Inc. would be entitled to the sum of all commissions earned by
it on the accounts sold or serviced by Ms. Burzee during the two years prior
to her termination, plus $10,000.524 Ms. Burzee's employment was termi-
nated by Park Avenue Insurance Agency, Inc. and she got a job with another
insurance agency. 25 Park Avenue Insurance Agency, Inc. claimed that Ms.
Burzee breached the noncompete agreement.5 26 The trial court agreed, and
based on the damages clause, awarded $161,572.88 in damages to Park Ave-
nue Insurance Agency, Inc.527 On appeal, Ms. Burzee argued that the dam-
ages award amounted to an unenforceable penalty and the Fifth District
Court of Appeal agreed.5 28 A liquidated damages clause that results in an
amount "so grossly disproportionate to any damages that might reasonably
be expected" will be deemed a penalty and unenforceable.5 29 The court, in
addressing the proportionality issue, pointed out that the same damage
amount would apply regardless of the number of customers with which Ms.
Burzee communicated, even if none of those customers actually became cus-
tomers of her new employer.53° The court concluded that "[t]he absence of
proportionality is patent., 531 In addition, even if this provision in some cir-
cumstances might be considered enforceable, it could not have been enforce-
able under the circumstances of this case. 532 "[E]quity may 'relieve against
[a] forfeiture"' if what might otherwise have been a proper liquidated dam-
ages provision "'appears unconscionable ... at the time of the breach.' 5 33
The court reversed insofar as the trial court had found that the damages
clause was a valid liquidated penalty provision and remanded the matter. 34
522. Id.
523. Id. at 1201--02.
524. Burzee, 946 So. 2d at 1201-02.
525. Id. at 1202.
526. See id.
527. Id.
528. Id. The legal effect of this contractual provision is an issue of law reviewed de novo.
Burzee, 946 So. 2d at 1202.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 1203.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 1203.
533. Burzee, 946 So. 2d at 1203 (quoting Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d 129, 132
(Fla. 1972)).
534. Id. Ms. Burzee also appealed the trial court's finding of civil contempt for violation
of an injunction and the fine imposed. Id. at 1201. The Fifth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed these portions of the trial court's decision without discussion. Id. at 1203.
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D. Right of First Refusal
In 1977, a right of first refusal had been granted to Old Port Cove Con-
dominium Association One, Inc. (Association) with respect to land adjacent
to Association's property, title to which had some time later vested in the
developer, Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc. (Developer).535 The option agree-
ment provided that the property would first be offered to Association on the
same terms and conditions as it would be offered to the public.536 Associa-
tion had thirty days to accept the offer.537 Failure to timely accept the offer
would terminate the right of first refusal.5 38 Developer brought an action to
have the right of first refusal declared void from the inception as being in
violation of the common law rule against perpetuities.539 The trial court
ruled in favor of Developer.54 ° On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal in Old Port Cove Condominium Ass 'n One, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Hold-
ing, Inc.,"' expressed doubt that the rule against perpetuities ever applied to
this kind of right of first refusal.542 Nevertheless, the court went on to sub-
ject the grant to a rule against perpetuities analysis.543 The court held that in
2000 the legislature abrogated the common law rule against perpetuities
when it amended section 689.225 of the Florida Statutes, and the abrogation
of the rule clearly was meant to be retroactive.544 Therefore, by statute, the
common law rule against perpetuities did not apply to the right of first re-
fusal.545 The court acknowledged that its decision regarding the retroactivity
of the 2002 amendment was in conflict with Fallschase Development Corp.
v. Blakey, 546 and certified conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida.547
535. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass'n One, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d
742, 742-43. (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The grant was made by Developer's predecessor
in interest. Id. at 742-43. The court noted that Developer was aware of the grant for more
than a decade before it instituted this action. Id. at 744.
536. Id. at 742.
537. Id.
538. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d at 742.
539. Id. at 743.
540. Id.
541. 954 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
542. Id. at 743.
543. Id. at 744-46.
544. Id. at 745 (citing FLA. STAT. § 689.225(7) (2005)).
545. Id. at 744. The Florida statutory rule against perpetuities excludes these types of
restraints. Although there was a period of time during which the option existed that the law
was otherwise, Developer failed to act under that statute to reform the option. Old Port Cove
Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d at 744.
546. 696 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
547. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d. at 746-47.
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The court went on to say that the right of first refusal might be suspect
as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.54s The court concluded that the
Association's option did not impose any burden on the sale of the prop-
erty. 49 In reversing and remanding, the court noted that Developer would
either get its price from the Association or from some other buyer, but the
price would be based upon market value, not a value fixed in the option.5
Therefore, the right of first refusal was not an unreasonable restraint on
alienation. 5 ' Had the right of first refusal allowed purchase at a fixed price
for an unlimited period of time, the result would have been different. 552
VII. DEEDS AND MORTGAGES
A. Deeds
The Fifth District Court of Appeal was called upon to sort out the issue
of superiority of title as between two purchasers of the same real estate from
the same transferor, Virginia Schwartz (Seller).553 Seller's husband, a resi-
dent of North Carolina, owned real estate in Marion County, Florida when he
died in 1994. 51 4 Seller's husband devised all of his property to Seller, but
according to the court's opinion, the husband's will was never probated.55
On June 25, 2004, Seller signed a contract to convey the Marion County real
estate to Mr. Rice, and on August 4, 2004, Seller delivered a warranty deed
to Mr. Rice. 56 Almost two months later, Seller entered into another contract
to sell the same real estate, only this time, to Mr. Greene. 57 On October 28,
2004, Mr. Greene paid for the real estate and received a warranty deed from
Seller.558 His deed was recorded on November 8. ""9 Mr. Rice, however,
did not get around to recording his deed until several weeks after Mr. Greene
recorded his.56° So which purchaser had priority of title?
548. Id. at 746.
549. Id. at 743.
550. Id. at 746.
551. Id.
552. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d. at 746 (quoting Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So.
2d 610, 615 (Fla. 1980)).
553. Rice v. Greene, 941 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
554. Id. at 1230.
555. Id.
556. Id. Apparently Mrs. Schwartz entered into the contract "on behalf of her deceased
husband." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
557. Rice, 941 So. 2d at 1231.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
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The trial court granted summary judgment to Mr. Greene, purchaser
number two, declaring his rights superior as between the two purchasers, and
Mr. Rice appealed.561 Mr. Rice argued that Seller did not have title to the
real estate, and therefore, common law, not the recording statute applied. 62
The Florida recording statute provides that, with respect to the rights of pur-
chasers of the same property, a subsequent purchaser of property for value
and without notice of the prior transaction has priority over an earlier pur-
chaser when the subsequent purchaser's deed is recorded first.5 63 Mr. Rice's
argument was grounded on section 733.103(1) of the Florida Statutes, which
provides that a decedent's will is "ineffective to prove title ... or the right to
possession of' the decedent's property until the will is admitted to probate. 5"
The result, Mr. Rice concluded, was that Seller did not have title to convey to
Mr. Greene, so she could not have conveyed anything to make the recording
statute applicable; consequently, common law applied and Mr. Rice had pri-
ority under his purchase agreement565
The court looked instead to section 732.514 of the Florida Statutes
which states that it is "'[t]he death of the testator ... [that serves to] vest[]
the right to devises"' in the devisees, unless the will provides otherwise.566
The court, reading those two sections of the Florida Probate Code in pari
materia observed that because the will was never probated, Seller "lacked
marketable title to the property. 5 67 The Third District Court of Appeal, in
affirming the trial court, stated "[h]owever, she clearly acquired equitable
title to the property upon her husband's death, assuming, as have the parties,
that Mr. Schwartz's will, which was presented to the court below, is authen-
tic."5
6 8
Therefore, under the recording statute, as between Mr. Greene and Mr.
Rice, Mr. Green had the priority claim to the property, which was the only
question the court had before it. 
569
561. Id. at 1230.
562. Rice, 941 So. 2d at 1232.
563. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1) (2004)).
564. Id. at 1231 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 733.103(1) (2004)).
565. Id.
566. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 732.514 (2004)).
567. Rice, 941 So. 2d at 1231.
568. Id. But what if the will was subsequently determined not to have been authentic?
Would Seller still have had equitable title so that the recording statute could have applied?
Some facts relevant to the court's determination may not have been recited in the opinion.
569. Id. at 1232. It is important to bear in mind that the court's ruling addressed only the
claim of priority as between the two purchasers, not any issue of marketable title or breach of
contract claims against seller. Id. at 1231.
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B. Mortgages
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Feinstein v. New Bethel Mission-
ary Baptist,570 held, as a matter of first impression, that an express provision
that imposes a prepayment penalty in the event of acceleration of the mort-
gage and note by the payee is enforceable. 71 New Bethel Missionary Baptist
Church (New Bethel) defaulted on its payments on a mortgage and note.5 72
Feinstein, the holder of the note and mortgage, accelerated the debt pursuant
to the terms of the promissory note and began foreclosure proceedings.1
73
The note not only imposed a prepayment fee if New Bethel prepaid the note,
it provided that the prepayment fee would apply if the payments were accel-
erated by the mortgagee on default.574 The trial court entered a final judg-
ment of foreclosure in favor of Feinstein, but denied Feinstein the prepay-
ment fee on the accelerated amount, which he had also requested.175 On ap-
peal, the Third District Court of Appeal observed that it could not find any
Florida decisions directly holding "that an express provision of a promissory
note ... call[ing] for a prepayment fee" upon acceleration of debt payments
is enforceable.76 The court noted that there were, however, cases including
a Supreme Court of Florida case, Florida National Bank v. Bankatlantic,
5 77
that opened the door for that result by "indicat[ing] that such would be [their]
holding" if a case with these facts presented itself.578 On the invitation and
authority of those cases, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court. 57
VIII. EMINENT DOMAIN
Three District Court of Appeal cases were similar because all of the
land owners sought damages as a result of a change in traffic flow.58 ° The
570. 938 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
571. Id. at 563; see also Feinstein v. Ashplant, 961 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (enforcing a prepayment on acceleration penalty sought by the same lender under a
provision similar to that involved in, and referring to, the decision of the Third District Court
of Appeal in Feinstein v. New Bethel Missionary Baptist).
572. Feinstein, 938 So. 2d at 563.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. 589 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1991).
578. Feinstein, 938 So. 2d at 563-64.
579. Id. at 564-65.
580. Dep't of Transp. v. Fisher, 958 So. 2d 586, 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); City of
Jacksonville v. Twin Rests., Inc., 953 So. 2d 720, 720-21 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007); City
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first two-related, if not the same--cases were condemnation cases,58' while
the third was an inverse condemnation case.582 A fourth case considered a
tenant's compensable interest and valuation.83
In the first condemnation case, City of Jacksonville v. Twin Restaurants,
Inc. (Twin),584 the City took some of the land owner's property in connection
with a road project. 85 As part of the project, the City would build a median
that would change the traffic flow to Twin's property.586 Twin alleged that
the change in traffic flow impeded its business. 87 The jury awarded Twin
$143,420 for the property taken plus $685,000 in "severance damages" for
the change in traffic flow. 88 The City appealed the severance damage
award.589 The First District Court of Appeal reversed, citing Department of
Transportation v. Capital Plaza, Inc. 90 The court held that severance dam-
ages may not be awarded for a change in the traffic flow resulting from a
median. 9' It was the construction of the median, not the taking of the prop-
erty, that caused the change of traffic flow.592
In Department of Transportation v. Fisher,593 the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) was involved in a project to elevate part of U.S. 19 and
building frontage roads on the elevated portion. 94 The Fishers operated a
carwash on U.S. 19 in Pinellas County.5 95 Before the project, the Fishers'
customers could get to the car wash from U.S. 19, but after the project, cus-
tomers had to travel on a frontage road to get to the car wash.596 The Fishers
alleged that this amounted to inverse condemnation and they sought compen-
sation based on a taking of access.5 97 The court noted that "inverse condem-
of Jacksonville v. Westland Park Assocs., II, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D440, D440 (1st Dist. Ct.
App. Feb. 12, 2007).
581. Twin Rests., Inc., 953 So. 2d at 721; Westland Park Assocs., II, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at
D440.
582. Fisher, 958 So. 2d at 588.
583. Dames v. 926 Co., 925 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
584. 953 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 720-21.
588. Id. at 720.
589. Twin Rests., Inc., 953 So. 2d at 720.
590. Id. at 724 (citing Dep't of Transp. v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla.
1981)).
591. Id. at 721.
592. Id.
593. 958 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
594. Id. at 588.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id. at 589.
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nation [occurs] when governmental action causes a substantial loss of access
to" the owner's property. 98 A physical taking of the owner's property is not
required to establish the right to compensation from the government.599
When there is a taking of property, plus a loss of access, money awarded for
the access loss will be termed severance damages.6 °° To be compensable, the
loss of access need not be total but at least "substantially diminished."60'
Therefore, the question was whether DOT's actions on its property, as op-
posed to the Fishers' property, amounted to a taking of access."' There was
no question that the most convenient route to the car wash was eliminated.603
The issue, however, was whether or not access to the Fishers' property had
been substantially diminished.6" Based on the record, the court found that
access to the Fishers' property was not substantially diminished. 605
In Dames v. 926 Co.,606 the Fourth District Court of Appeal considered
the relevant date for determining who the holders of compensable interests
were for the property known as 910 West Atlantic Avenue, Delray Beach,
which was taken by eminent domain. 67  The compensable interest issue
arose out the Dames' purchase in 1998 of Delray Coin Laundry, Inc. from
the Millanises. 6 ' As part of the purchase, the Dames gave the Millanises a
$75,000 promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage. 60 9  Delray Coin
Laundry, Inc. was then the lessee of the subject property and 926 Company,
Inc., the property owner, was the lessor.610 In connection with the purchase
by the Dames, Delray Coin Laundry, Inc. assigned the lease to the Dames
598. Fisher, 958 So. 2d at 589 (quoting Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846,
849 (Fla. 1989)). Can construction of a median, with or without an actual taking ever support
a claim for inverse condemnation? Although it did not use the term inverse condemnation, the
court in Twin Restaurants also concluded that the access of Twin's customers would not be
"substantially diminished." City of Jacksonville v. Twin Rests., Inc., 953 So. 2d 720, 722-23
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Fisher, 958 So.2d at 589)). It appears that the cite to
Fisher is to the original opinion, which was withdrawn and substituted with a later opinion
after the denial of the motion for rehearing because Judge Isom dissented from the denial of
the motion. See Fisher, 958 So. 2d. at 593-94.
599. Id. at 589.
600. See id.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Fisher, 958 So. 2d at 591.
604. Id. at 589.
605. Id. at 590-91.
606. 925 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
607. Id. at 1079-81.
608. Id. at 1079.
609. Id. at 1079-80.
610. Id. at 1079.
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individually.6"' In 2002, the Delray Beach Community Redevelopment
Agency (Agency) instituted an eminent domain proceeding with respect to
the property and included Mr. and Mrs. Dames among the respondents.
6 2
On July 17, 2003, Agency deposited $567,163 into the registry of the court
pursuant to the court's Agreed Order of Taking.613 926 Company, Inc. was
awarded compensation of $615,000 for the property taken by Agency. 614
The deposit by Agency allowed it title and possession as of July 17, 2003.615
In June 2003, the Dames defaulted on their installment obligation to the Mil-
lanises, and in December 2003, the Millanises sought to foreclose upon the
chattel mortgage.6t 6 The Millanises' foreclosure action resulted in their re-
taking of the leasehold interest.
617
With respect to the compensable interests issue, 926 Company, Inc.
claimed that the Dames were not entitled to any portion of the amount of an
award. 618 Although tenants are entitled to a share of condemnation proceeds,
926 Company, Inc. argued, and the trial court agreed, that the Dames "were
not entitled to compensation., 619 The Dames appealed and the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.62' The court held that July 17,
2003, the date on which proceeds were deposited with the clerk, which was
the date for valuation and the date that title was transferred under sections
73.071(2) and 74.061 of the Florida Statutes, respectively, was also the date
for determining compensable interests in the property.62' As of July 17,
2003, the Dames were the lessees of the property under a lease that was then
in full force and effect. 622 They were entitled to a share of the condemnation
611. Dames, 925 So. 2d at 1080. The landlord argued that the Dames' were not the les-
sees, but rather Delray Coin Laundry, Inc., the corporation that the Dames' had purchased,
was the lessee. Id. The court easily disposed of this issue, finding that Delray Coin Laundry,
Inc. had assigned the lease to the Dames, individually, as part of the sale of the corporation
and business assets. Id.
612. Id. at 1079.
613. Id.
614. Dames, 925 So. 2d at 1079.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 1081.
617. Id. at 1080.
618. Id.
619. Dames, 925 So. 2d at 1080.
620. Id. at 1082.
621. Id. at 1080-81.
622. Id. at 1081. The fact that the tenants abandoned the property after the date the title
transferred, but prior to the date vacation of the premises was required under the Order of
Taking, was irrelevant. Id. Also irrelevant was the fact that the tenants later defaulted on
their payments to seller under the promissory note and chattel mortgage, and that the seller
had instituted foreclosure proceedings in December 2003. Dames, 925 So. 2d at 1081. Fur-
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proceeds, as the events occurring after July 17, 2003 were held to be irrele-
vant. 
623
The legislature amended Florida's eminent domain laws in 2006 in re-
sponse to the United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New
London.624 The United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution did not prohibit the city from taking private
property by eminent domain for economic development, which the Court
held to be a "public purpose," even though the property might be transferred
to private individuals. 625  Among the revisions to the Florida Statutes are
provisions that remove the authority to take property to eliminate public nui-
sance, slum, or blight conditions, or preservation or enhancement of the tax
base,626 and prohibit transfer of taken property to a private entity, with excep-
tions for common carriers, private and public utilities, and certain "special
use" private entities.627
IX. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Covenants Not to Compete
There were numerous appellate cases decided during the survey period
that involved covenants not to compete, some of which were entered into in
the context of buy-sell agreements, 628 while in other cases, they arose solely
out of an employment relationship where there was no ownership interest. 629
In Whitby v. Infinity Radio, Inc.,630 Whitby, who worked for WRMF-
FM radio from 1980 to 1995, went to work for WEAT-FM in 1995.63, The
ther, the fact that the tenants were in default under the lease with owner was also irrelevant
where owner had not taken any action to terminate the lease. Id. at 1081 n. 1.
623. Id. at 1081.
624. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
625. Id. at 484.
626. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.014(1)-(2), 163.335(7) (2007).
627. Id. § 73.013(1)-(2).
628. See infra note 660 and accompanying text.
629. See, e.g., Whitby v. Infinity Radio, Inc., 961 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007); Litwinczuk v. Palm Beach Cardiovascular Clinic, L.C., 939 So. 2d 268, 270, 273 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the medical clinic had a legitimate interest to protect the
existing patient goodwill in the specified geographic area); JonJuan Salon, Inc. v. Acosta, 922
So. 2d 1081, 1083-84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming an order granting a temporary
injunction against a former employee of a hair salon where salon demonstrated that a covenant
was supported by legitimate interests of protecting goodwill and the substantial relationship
with its customers, and the former employee breached covenant); Colucci v. Kar Kare Auto.
Group, Inc., 918 So. 2d 431, 434 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
630. Whitby, 961 So. 2d at 349.
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1995 employment agreement between Whitby and the then owner of WEAT-
FM contained a non-compete clause.632 In 2000, four days before her em-
ployment contract with WEAT-FM was due to expire, Whitby entered into
an employment agreement with the owner of WRMF-FM.633 On the day the
WEAT-FM agreement expired, Whitby started working for WRMF-FM. 634
Infinity Radio, Inc., the owner of WEAT-FM, sought and obtained a tempo-
rary injunction against Whitby, alleging violation of the non-compete agree-
ment.635 The trial court subsequently found that Whitby had violated the
temporary injunction and was "in indirect civil contempt," and she was fined
$100,000.636 The order allowed Whitby to avoid the fine by committing no
further violation of the temporary injunction.637 Subsequently, the trial court
found that Whitby had again violated the temporary injunction, directed
payment of the fine, and threatened Whitby with jail upon nonpayment.638
The court found that Whitby had the financial ability to pay the fine.639
Running parallel with the contempt proceeding was a breach of contract
action against Whitby and her new employer.6"° Whitby argued that once the
issues leading to the contempt citation had been resolved by the award in the
parallel proceedings, the court lost jurisdiction to impose contempt sanc-
tions."4  The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed. 642 The trial court
retained jurisdiction to conclude ancillary matters, which included the con-
tempt proceeding. 63 Although the court must find that the contemnor has
the ability to pay a coercive civil fine before enforcing it, the trial court so
found in this case on competent evidence. 644 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal also observed that threatening incarceration for nonpayment of a
coercive civil contempt fine is not improper. 645
631. Id. at 351.
632. Id. There were several changes in ownership of WEAT-FM during the following few
years, and in 1999, Whitby and the station's new owner, Infinity Radio, Inc., executed an
amendment to the 1995 agreement reaffirming the 1995 agreement. See id.
633. Id.
634. Whitby, 961 So. 2d at 351.
635. Id.
636. Id. at 352, 355.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 355.
639. Whitby, 961 So. 2d at 352.
640. Id.
641. Id. at 353.
642. Id.
643. Id. at 353-54.
644. Whitby, 961 So. 2d at 354.
645. Id. at 356.
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In another case, Leighton v. First Universal Lending, LLC, 6 a former
employee of a lending company opened a lending business. 47 The former
employer sought an injunction against the former employee and the em-
ployee's new company, although the employee's new company was not a
party to the non-compete agreement and was not made a party to the law-
suit.6 8 With respect to the injunction against the employee's new company,
the court noted that a third party could be enjoined in connection with en-
forcing a non-compete agreement, but notice and an opportunity to be heard
were required.,M 9 The former employee also claimed that the non-compete
agreement was unenforceable because the former employer had breached the
employment agreement.65 With respect to the breach of contract defense,
the court held that the former employer's breach of the employment contract
was an equitable defense that could be raised by the former employee, but
proof of the breach was required.65' However, the former employee failed to
demonstrate the breach of contract.652
In another covenant not to compete case, Colucci v. Kar Kare Automo-
tive Group, Inc.,653 Colucci sold his business to, and became an employee of,
Kar Kare. 654 He then entered into a non-compete agreement with Kar Kare
that, with the exception of a limited area in Florida, purportedly applied an-
ywhere in the United States for five years after termination of his employ-
ment.655 Kar Kare sought an injunction after Colucci left its employ, alleging
that Colucci beached the covenant not to compete by conducting business in
Florida that went beyond the scope agreed upon in the contract.656 The em-
ployer, therefore, stopped making payments on a promissory note that was
given in connection with the purchase of the business.657 However, the orig-
inal agreement between the parties provided that the covenant not to compete
would not apply if the payments on the purchase agreement were not
made. 658 The trial court granted the injunction and Colucci appealed. 659 The
646. 925 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
647. Id. at 463.
648. Id. at 463-64.
649. Id. at 465.
650. Id. at 464.
651. Leighton, 925 So. 2d at 464.
652. Id.
653. 918 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
654. Id. at 434.
655. Id.
656. Id. at 433-34.
657. Id. at 437.
658. Colucci, 918 So. 2d at 436-37. In this case, the covenant not to compete was effec-
tive upon the employee's termination of employment, even if that occurred before all pay-
ments under the promissory note given for the purchase of the business had been made. See
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Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that a court may consider an em-
ployer's breach of an employment agreement when determining if an injunc-
tion should be granted.660 If the breach is material, then the employee gener-
ally will be relieved from the covenant. 66' Further, the court noted that it
must consider the defense if it is raised.662 Colucci, however, did not claim
that the employer's breach was a complete defense, so the court was required
to consider whether the employer had met its burden of establishing that "it
[would] suffer irreparable harm . . . ha[d] no adequate remedy at law . . .
ha[d] a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and . . . that . . .
[granting the] temporary injunction [furthered] the public interest., 63  The
appellate court stated that irreparable harm could not be said to exist in this
case unless Kar Kare could demonstrate that it had a legitimate business in-
terest to protect. 664 However, Kar Kare could not specify any lost clients or
confidential business information, even though Colucci was using a similar
name in the new business. 665 Therefore, Kar Kare did not show that it had
suffered any irreparable harm, and thus could not qualify for the injunc-
tion.666 Section 542.335(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes sets out a "nonexclu-
sive list of 'legitimate business interests.' ' 667 Case law has expanded that
list.668 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the record did not
show that Kar Kare demonstrated that it had a legitimate business interest
under the statute or case law. 669
id. at 436. In Alvarez, the covenant not to compete was not effective until the redemption
occurred. Alvarez v. Rendon, 953 So. 2d 702, 710 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007). Also, the
payments for Rendon's stock in Alvarez would not have been required to have been made
until the redemption. Id. The impact a subsequent default in payment would have had on
Rendon's obligations under the covenant not to compete was not an issue. See id. In addition,
the court did not specifically address Rendon's defense that the employer breached the agree-
ment, as the court found that Rendon's obligation under the covenant could not have arisen
there having been no redemption of stock. Id.
659. Colucci, 918 So. 2d at 433.
660. Id. at 437.
661. Id. (citing Benemerito & Flores v. Roche, 751 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999)).
662. Id.
663. Id. at 438 (quoting Net First Nat'l Bank v. First Telebanc Corp., 834 So. 2d 944, 949
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
664. Colucci, 918 So. 2d at 438.
665. Id. at 440. Even though that may have been evidence of Colucci's breach of the sale
agreement, it did not result in irreparable harm. Id. at 440-41.
666. Id. at 441.
667. Id. at 438.
668. Colucci, 918 So. 2d at 439.
669. Id. at 440.
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B. Discrimination
In El Toro Exterminator of Florida, Inc. v. Cernada,670 El Toro Exter-
minator of Florida, Inc. (El Toro) provided pest control services for Miami-
Dade County's bus fleet. 671  The contract between El Toro and the County
contained restrictions on the products that could be used.67 2 Mr. Cernada, El
Toro's former service operations manager, testified that he was told to use
and "conceal the use of' a particular pesticide and not to use protective gear
so as not to alert the County.6 3 The court found that when Mr. Cernada
complained to the owners about the physical effects the pesticide was having
on him, he was "subjected to racial and ethnic slurs" and given undesirable
work schedules. 674  Finally, Mr. Cemada informed Miami-Dade County's
Pest Control Manager of the probhibed use. 675 The court also found that one
of the owners of El Toro threatened Mr. Cemada.676 Mr. Cemada then quit
his job.677 He sued El Toro, alleging, among other claims, "retaliation under
the Florida Private Sector Whistleblower's Act," section 448.102(3) of the
Florida Statutes. 68 "At the conclusion of [Mr.] Cernada's case,. . . El Toro
moved for a directed verdict on the ... [whistleblower] claim" arguing that
Mr. Cernada failed to prove his case as pled.6 9 El Toro's position was that
Mr. Cernada had not specifically identified the laws El Toro was said to have
violated. 68" However, Cernada's lawyer had orally argued, without objec-
tion, the pertinent "ordinances and administrative code sections" El Toro was
alleged to have violated. 68 ' The trial court denied El Toro's motion and al-
lowed Mr. Cernada to amend his pleadings "to conform to the evidence. 6 2
El Toro appealed both rulings.6 3 In affirming the trial court, the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing Mr. Cemada to amend his pleadings. 6 4 'Leave to amend shall be
670. 953 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
671. Id. at 617.
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Cernada, 953 So. 2d at 617.
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 448.102(3) (2002)). He also sought unpaid wages and al-
leged negligent supervision. Id.
679. Cernada, 953 So. 2d at 617.
680. Id.
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. Id.
684. Cernada, 953 So. 2d at 618.
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freely given .. ,,685 El Toro's conduct complained of in this case remained
unchanged after the amendment of Mr. Cemada's pleadings.686 Furthermore,
El Toro was not prejudiced because the trial court allowed the amendment.687
The allegations in the amendment should have come as no surprise to El To-
ro. 688
El Toro next argued that Mr. Cemada's claim under the Whistleblower
Act must fail because El Toro was not given "an opportunity to remedy [its
alleged] offensive conduct. ' 689 The court observed that the record of Mr.
Cemada's actions was contrary to El Toro's assertions. 69' This was a case
for the jury.691
X. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND GOVERNANCE
In Orlinsky v. Patraka,692 Orlinsky and Patraka were at one time both
employed by their father-in-law's company.6 93 Later, they decided to go into
business together without their father-in-law.694 They initially had a written
agreement. 695 The agreement provided that they would have "equal salaries
and benefits," and would share equally in business profits and losses from
Visual Scene, Inc.696 Patraka alleged that after several years, they decided to
do without a written agreement and "orally agreed [that] they would be equal
partners in any [business] they operated. 697 Indeed, for thirty years Orlinsky
and Patraka were in business together sharing everything equally. 698 How-
ever, due to a financial reverse, and in order to keep their business going
after a creditor foreclosed on the assets of Visual Scene, Inc., they decided
that in order to buy back Visual Scene from the creditor, it was necessary to
sell an interest in their business to investors who happened to be foreign-
ers. 69 9 A new entity was formed, Visual Scene International (VSI), in which
685. Id. (quoting Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Shulman, 481 So. 2d 965, 967 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986)).
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Cernada, 953 So. 2d at 618.
690. Id..
691. Id.
692. 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1637 (3d Dist. Ct. App. July 5, 2007).
693. Id. at D1638.
694. Id.
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1638.
698. Id.
699. Id.
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Orlinsky and Patraka "each received [a] 25.83% interest. '' 700 The upshot was
that as part of a conversion from a "C" corporation to an "S" corporation,
Orlinsky purchased the shares owned by the foreign investors in the operat-
ing company, VSI.701 Orlinsky then owned a 69% share of VSI, and Patraka
owned a minority interest. 72 Not long after that, the Articles of Incorpora-
tion were amended and all of the shareholders waived their preemptive
rights.7 3 Orlinsky and Patraka had a falling out and VSI's board of directors
fired Patraka.70 Patraka filed a complaint in court against Orlinsky. 75 He
alleged breach of oral contract in count one, breach of fiduciary relationship
in count two, sought imposition of a constructive trust in count three, and
alleged tortious interference in count four.706  The trial court granted Or-
linsky's motion for a directed verdict as to counts one, three, and four, but
allowed count two, breach of fiduciary duty, to go to the jury.707 The jury
returned a verdict for Patraka consisting of $887,000 for the VSI stock he did
not receive as part of the conversion to an S corporation and $3,431,248 for
benefits he did not receive because he was fired.70 8 On appeal, the court de-
termined that Orlinsky had not breached any fiduciary duty owed to Patraka
and reversed the trial court's denial of a directed verdict on count two. 709
The Third District Court of Appeal discussed the fiduciary duty issue in four
ways: 1) was there a general fiduciary duty?; 2) was there an agency rela-
tionship?; 3) was there a duty imposed on Orlinsky as majority shareholder?;
and 4) was Orlinsky obliged to support the continued employment of
Patraka?71 °
The court answered no to each of the questions.7 1 The court found no
evidence of breach of general fiduciary duty, concluding that this claim was
no different from the breach of oral agreement claim that had been properly
dismissed by the trial court.712 As to agency, there was no evidence that Or-
linsky agreed to act on Patraka's behalf in dealings with foreign investors.713
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1638.
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. Id.
707. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1638.
708. Id.
709. Id. at D1640.
710. Id at D1639-40.
711. Id.
712. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D 1639.
713. Id.
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Although Orlinsky, a majority shareholder, owed Patraka, a minority share-
holder, a fiduciary duty, Orlinsky was a minority shareholder when he pur-
chased the stock from the foreign investor shareholders."' "There was no
shareholder agreement in place" that would have given Patraka the right to
purchase an equal number of shares-preemptive rights having been
waived'.7 5  Finally, and as a matter of first impression, the court adopted
Delaware's rule that issues of wrongful employment termination are personal
and contractual and are separate from any rights that the employee may have
as a shareholder.7 6 A majority shareholder's fiduciary duties are likewise
separate from employment issues.
7 17
XI. INSURANCE
Nob Hill Plaza (Landlord) leased shopping center space to New York
Buffet (Tenant). 71' The lease agreement required Tenant to obtain casualty
insurance covering the leased premises with the policy to name Nob Hill
Plaza as an additional insured or loss payee. 7 9 Tenant bought the insurance
from Lloyd's of London (Lloyd's), but failed to have the policy include the
Landlord.12 0 The premises were damaged by fire, and an insurance claim
was filed by Tenant.7 2 ' Lloyd's denied Tenant's claim, and Landlord sued
Tenant for damages. 722  Tenant filed a third-party complaint against
Lloyd's. 723  The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint.7 2 4  The
Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that it appeared that the trial court
concluded that because Landlord did not qualify as a third-party beneficiary
of Tenant's insurance policy, the third-party complaint was improper. 725 The
Fourth District Court disagreed with the trial court.726 Since Lloyd's may
have to pay for the damage for which Landlord was suing Tenant, the third-
714. Id.
715. Id.
716. Id. at D1640.
717. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1640.
718. N.Y. Buffet, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 950 So. 2d 438, 439
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
719. Id.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id.
723. N.Y Buffet, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 439.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id.
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party complaint was proper.7 27 The Court added that "the trial court could
sever the third-party action to prevent prejudice to [Lloyd's].72 8
XII. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE INTERNET
In 1991, Ms. Almeida's mother gave written permission to fashion pho-
tographer Fabrio Cabral to take and use Ms. Almeida's photograph for ex-
hibit and publication.729 Ms. Almeida was ten years old at the time.730 Ms.
Almeida's photo was published in a book, Anjos Proibidos (Forbidden An-
gels).73' A second edition of Anjos Proibidos was published in 2000.732 MS.
Almeida's photo was on the cover. 73 Amazon sold the second edition online
on its website.734 Amazon's product detail page displayed the second edition
photograph of Ms. Almeida. 7 In addition, a quote was attributed to her.736
Ms. Almeida's attorney sent a demand letter to Amazon for statutory dam-
ages under section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes "for its unauthorized use of
Ms. Almeida's image. Amazon responded by promptly removing the
book's listing from its websites.7 38 Ms. Almeida's lawyer sent a second let-
ter to Amazon demanding damages pursuant to section 772.11 of the Florida
Statutes for civil theft. 739 In November 2003, Ms. Almeida filed suit in Mi-
ami-Dade County Circuit Court alleging claims under both statutes relied
upon by her attorney in his letters. 740 Amazon removed the case to federal
district court based on diversity jurisdiction.74 ' The federal district court
granted Amazon's motion for summary judgment on all of Ms. Almeida's
claims,742 and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.743
The first issue was whether the Federal Communications Decency Act
of 1996 (CDA) preempted Ms. Almeida's right of publicity claim under the
727. Id. at 440.
728. NY Buffet, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 440.
729. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (11 th Cir. 2006).
730. Id. at 1318.
731. Id. at 1319.
732. Id.
733. Id.
734. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1319.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2006)).
738. Id.
739. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1319 (citing FLA. STAT. § 772.11 (2006)).
740. Id.
741. Id.
742. Id.
743. Id. at 1328.
[Vol. 32
60
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss1/3
FLORIDA LA WAFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS
Florida law.'" The court observed that the CDA was intended to grant im-
munity to any cause of action that would make internet service providers
liable for information that originated with a third-party user of the service-
in this case, Ophelia Editions.745 The court also observed that the CDA was
not intended to affect intellectual property rights.746 Ms. Almeida argued
that the federal statute did not preempt the Florida publicity right statute
since a publicity right is an intellectual property right.74 7 The court stated
that "[w]hether the CDA immunize[d] an interactive service provider from a
state law right of publicity claim" was a question of first impression for the
Eleventh Circuit."' The court declined to decide the question because it
found that Ms. Almeida's publicity right claim failed the requirements of the
Florida statute.749 The court concluded that Ms. Almeida's photograph was
not used "for trade, commercial, or advertising purposes as those terms are
used in the statute., 750 The court found that Amazon's use of book cover
images only "simulates a customer's experience browsing book covers in a
traditional book store."75' The use of book covers is only "incidental to, and
customary for," internet book sellers.752 The court also rejected the civil
theft claim under sections 812.012-812.037 and section 772.11 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, finding that Ms. Almeida failed to provide clear and convincing
evidence of an injury that could have been caused by civil theft, and likewise
failed to show felonious intent on Amazon's part.
753
The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court's award of attor-
ney's fees to Amazon pursuant to section 772.11 of the Florida Statutes,
finding that the civil theft claim was raised without substantial factual or
legal support. 754
Legislation was enacted in 2006 amending Florida's trademark law to
make it more consistent with the Federal Trademark Act of 1946, as
amended. 75 Chapter 495 of the Florida Statutes has been given the name
744. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1320; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
745. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321.
746. Id. at 1323.
747. See id. at 1322; see also FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2006).
748. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1322.
749. Id. at 1324.
750. Id. at 1325.
751. Id. at 1326.
752. Id.
753. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1327 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 772.11, 812.012-.037 (2006)).
754. Id. at 1328.
755. Act effective Jan. 1, 2007, ch. 2006-191, § 20, 2006 Fla. Laws 1952, 1970 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 495.181 (2006)).
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"Registration and Protection of Trademarks Act." '756 The definitional section
of the statute has been substantially reworded.757 A trademark application
review, amendment, and administrative hearing process has been created. 758
Notably, the duration of a registered mark has been reduced from ten years to
five years.759 A change of trademark name is to be filed with the Department
of State. 760 The statute also now provides that a security interest in a mark
may be created and perfected under the Uniform Commercial Code."' It
also changes the law to allow an owner of a "famous mark" to pursue reme-
dies, including an injunction, to prevent dilution of the mark.762
XIII. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. Torts
In Hunt v. Cornerstone Golf, Inc.,763 Daly, a golfer and Tennessee resi-
dent, and Chamberland, an employee of John Daly Enterprises (JDE), a Flor-
ida corporation, granted two companies, Cornerstone, a Georgia corporation,
and Hippo, a British corporation, owned partly by Hunt, overlapping "exclu-
sive" rights to the use of Daly's name and likeness. 71 JDE terminated Cor-
nerstone's trademark rights contract about six months before its scheduled
expiration date, and Cornerstone brought suit in Broward County against
Hippo, Hunt, a California subsidiary of Hippo, JDE, and Daly alleging tor-
tious interference with its trademark license. 765 The trial court denied Hunt's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and Hunt appealed.7 66 The
issue was whether, under Wendt v. Horowitz, 767 Cornerstone satisfied the
two-part jurisdictional test.7 68 First, were sufficient jurisdictional facts al-
leged that Hunt committed a tortious act in Florida and that the cause of ac-
756. Id. § 1, 2006 Fla. Laws at 1954 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 495.001 (2007)).
757. Id. §2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.011 (2006)).
758. Id. § 6, 2006 Fla. Laws at 1958-59 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 495.035 (2007)).
759. Id. § 9, 2006 Fla. Laws at 1960 (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.071 (2006)).
760. Ch. 2006-191, § 10, 2006 Fla. Laws 1962 (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.081(3)
(2006)).
761. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.081(5)).
762. Id. § 17, 2006 Fla. Laws at 1968-69 (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.151(1)-(2) (2006)).
763. 949 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
764. Id. at 229.
765. Id.
766. Id. The decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed personal jurisdic-
tion with respect to Hunt only. Id. The opinion does not mention if other defendants filed
motions to dismiss. See Hunt, 949 So. 2d at 229-31.
767. 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002).
768. Hunt, 949 So. 2d at 230.
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tion arose from that alleged tortious act?769 Second, were there minimum
contacts between the defendant and Florida that would satisfy due process
requirements? 770
It was Cornerstone's burden to prove under the first part of the test that
the alleged tortious interference took place in Florida. 7 Under Wendt,
where a party asserts jurisdiction over another based on the commission of a
tort in Florida that involves a communication originating outside of Florida
and there is no physical presence of the other in Florida, the alleged tort must
have arisen from that communication. 7 " Hunt was never in Florida, but
Hunt made telephone calls and sent two e-mails to Chamberland in Florida
concerning JDE's contract with Cornerstone.7 73 The question, therefore, was
whether Cornerstone's claim arose from those contacts.77 ' The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that because Hunt initially got in touch with an
agent of Daly in Washington, D.C. and with Daly in Tennessee regarding
Hunt's interest in the exclusive trademark rights, any claim for tortious inter-
ference should have been made where those initial communications oc-
curred, not in Florida. 775 Having determined that Cornerstone failed the first
part of the jurisdiction test, it was unnecessary for the Court to opine on the
sufficiency of Hunt's contacts with Florida.776
In Deloitte & Touche v. Gencor Industries, Inc.,7 Gencor Industries,
Inc. (Gencor U.S.) acquired a United Kingdom company, which became
Gencor ACP (Gencor U.K.). 778 As part of the transaction, Gencor U.K. en-
gaged Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte & Touche U.K.), a United Kingdom part-
nership, to audit its books. 779 Gencor U.S.'s Florida auditor was Deloitte &
Touche U.S. 78° Deloitte & Touche U.K. conducted the audit of Gencor U.K.
and sent its audit report to Deloitte & Touche U.S. in Florida.7 "' Deloitte &
Touche U.S. passed the report on to Gencor U.S. 782 Gencor U.S. claimed
that the Deloitte & Touche U.K.'s audit report was defective and brought suit
769. Id.
770. Id.
771. Id.
772. Id.
773. Hunt, 949 So. 2d at 230.
774. See id.
775. Id.
776. Id. at 231 n.2.
777. 929 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
778. Id. at 679.
779. Id.
780. Id.
781. Id. at 681.
782. Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 681.
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against Deloitte & Touche U.S. and Deloitte & Touche U.K. in the Orange
County Circuit Court alleging professional negligence and negligent misrep-
resentation.783 The first issue was one of in personam jurisdiction, that is,
whether or not Deloitte & Touche U.K.'s actions could be found to be the
commission of a tortious act in Florida under the long-arm statute, section
48.193(l)(b) of the Florida Statutes.7" The second issue was venue. 785
The Fifth District Court of Appeal stated that, under Wendt, the alleged
tort must have arisen from the "transmission" of that communication.786
Deloitte & Touche U.K. argued that Gencor U.S. claimed only to have relied
on a report received from Deloitte & Touche U.S. 78 7 Therefore, according to
Deloitte & Touche U.K., the alleged tort could not have arisen out of any
transmission by it to Gencor U.S. because its transmission of the report was
to Deloitte U.S. 788 The court acknowledged that this case differed from the
facts of OSI Industries, Inc. v. Carter,789 and all other Florida cases it knew
of, in that the communication from which the alleged misrepresentation was
said to arise was not transmitted to the person claiming to have relied on the
misrepresentation. 790 The Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded, based on
"the peculiar nature of the particular tort at issue," that it did not matter that
Deloitte & Touche U.K.'s audit report was not sent directly to Gencor
U.S.7 9' It was sufficient that Gencor U.S.'s unrefuted jurisdictional allega-
tions were to the effect that "the reports were sent to Florida" and that
Deloitte & Touche U.K. must have known "that [the] reports would be relied
on in Florida by Gencor [U.S.] and they were relied upon in Florida by Gen-
cor [U.S.].
79 2
Perhaps the most important aspect of the decision, however, is what the
Fifth District Court of Appeal said with respect to liability of accountants for
negligent misrepresentation. 79 In reaching its decision on the jurisdictional
issue, the court noted that although the Supreme Court of Florida had not
783. Id. at 679.
784. Id.
785. Id.
786. Id. at 680. There was no claim that Deloitte & Touche U.K. had any physical pres-
ence in Florida or that anyone from Deloitte & Touche U.K. was ever in Florida in connection
with any business dealings with Gencor U.S. or any of its subsidiaries, including Gencor U.K.
Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 680.
787. Id. at 680-81.
788. Id. at 681.
789. 834 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
790. Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 680-81.
791. Id. at 681.
792. Id. at 683.
793. Id. at 681.
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made it perfectly clear whether Florida has adopted the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts... rule with respect to liability of accountants for negligent
misrepresentation in connection with an audit, 795 based on Florida Supreme
Court cases, 796 "it is difficult reasonably to reach any other conclusion.
' 79 7
The other issue, venue, was based on the audit agreement between Gen-
cor U.K. and Deloitte & Touche U.K., which provided that claims by a party
would be litigated in the United Kingdom. 79' The trial court found that the
provision did not apply to Gencor U.S. because it "was not a party to the
contract.,, 799 The Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled that a non-party could
be bound by a choice of forum clause if, as the court found with respect to
Gencor U.S., "the interests of a non-party are directly related to or com-
pletely derivative of those of a contracting party."8 ° Therefore, even though
the Orange County Circuit Court acquired jurisdiction over Deloitte &
Touche U.K., Gencor U.S.'s claim against Deloitte & Touche U.K. had to be
litigated in the United Kingdom.80
In another Fifth District Court of Appeal case, Thorpe v. Gelbwaks,80 2
the Thorpes sued Gelbwaks in Florida, in connection with the Thorpes' pur-
chase of a franchise operation.80 3 The Thorpes alleged, among other things,
that Gelbwaks defrauded them in Florida.80 4 Gelbwaks, a New Hampshire
resident, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Flor-
794. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). The Restatement (Second) rule
extended liability of accountants for negligent misrepresentation (negligence) beyond the
privity limitation set forth in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). See
First Fla. Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 11-12 (Fla. 1990). Under the
Restatement (Second), liability extends to those with whom the alleged tortfeasor is in privity
of contract, those to whom the tortfeasor intends to supply it, and those the alleged tortfeasor
"knows that the recipient intends to supply it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a)
(1977).
795. Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 681 (citing Nationsbank, N.A. v. KPMG Peat Mar-
wick, LLP, 813 So. 2d 964, 967 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
796. See, e.g., Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So. 2d 334, 339 (Fla.
1997); First Fla. Bank, N.A., 558 So. 2d at 15.
797. Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 681.
798. Id. at 680.
799. Id. at 683.
800. Id. at 684.
801. Id. at 683.
802. 953 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
803. Id. at 608.
804. Id. The claims included "violation of the Sale of Business Opportunities Act," sec-
tions 559.80 to 559.815 of the Florida Statutes, and violation of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.213 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 608
nn.2-3.
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ida's long-arm statute."' Gelbwaks' supporting affidavit denied all allega-
tions of wrongdoing. 0 6 The Thorpes filed the affidavit of Robert Gregg, a
former employee of the same corporation that employed Gelbwaks. °7 Mr.
Gregg's affidavit was to the effect that Gelbwaks was Vice President of
Franchise Operations and would regularly stay in Florida during the work
week. 808 The trial court granted Gelbwaks' motion to dismiss, finding that
Gelbwaks' affidavit shifted to the Thorpes the burden of proving that Gelb-
waks committed a tort in Florida, a burden that they did not carry.809 In addi-
tion, the trial court concluded that Mr. Gregg's affidavit did not refute Gelb-
waks' sworn denials of wrongdoing.1 ° The Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded.81' The trial court mistakenly believed that the Thor-
pes had the burden of proving that the Gelbwaks actually committed a tort in
Florida.812 However, the Thorpes need only prove that the acts alleged to
have constituted the tort occurred in Florida to invoke the long-arm statute.813
In addition, Gregg's affidavit established Gelbwaks' sufficient minimum
contacts with the state. 814 Thus, the Thorpes passed the two-part jurisdic-
tional test.815
B. Contracts
In Woodard Chevrolet, Inc. v. Taylor Corp.,816 Woodard Chevrolet, a
California company, and Taylor Corporation, a Florida corporation that does
direct mail advertising from Florida, entered into a contract for Taylor to
perform advertising services for Woodard Chevrolet. 8 7 Taylor had solicited
Woodard's business with respect to mailing advertising to Woodard's poten-
tial California customers. 81 8 The contract was signed by Woodard Chevrolet
in California, and "[n]o meetings were held in Florida" regarding the con-
tract. 819  Taylor performed services and Woodard made some of the pay-
805. Id. at 608.
806. Thorpe, 953 So. 2d at 608.
807. Id.
808. Id. at 608-09.
809. Id. at 609.
810. Id.
811. Thorpe, 953 So. 2d at 612.
812. Id. at 611.
813. Id. at 609.
814. Id. at 611.
815. Id.
816. 949 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
817. Id. at 269.
818. Id.
819. Id.
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ments due to Taylor under the contract. 2° Taylor sued Woodard in Broward
County for breach of contract.82' Taylor alleged that there was jurisdiction
based on Woodard Chevrolet's breach of contract by its failure to make
payments that were required to be made in Florida.122 The trial court ruled
that it had jurisdiction over Woodard and Woodard appealed.823
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, once again relying on Wendt, ob-
served that Florida has a two-part test for determining if "there is long-arm
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. '8 24  First, are sufficient jurisdic-
tional facts alleged?825  Second, are there enough "minimum contacts be-
tween the defendant and Florida to satisfy . . . due process require-
ments[?] '' 826 The allegations satisfied the first part of the test under section
48.193(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes.827 However, the court was unable to
find sufficient minimum contacts between Woodard and Florida to satisfy
due process. 828 Taylor made contact with Woodard in California. 29 No one
claiming to be a representative of Woodard was ever in Florida. 83 It could
not be said that Woodard ever sought the privileges of doing business in
Florida.83' The second part of the test was not satisfied and the trial court's
judgment was reversed. 832
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The case of Hammond v. DSY Developers, LLC,833 discussed earlier in
this survey,834 dealt with the local action rule and in rem jurisdiction in a real
estate matter. 835 The Third District Court of Appeal said that, "[a]lthough the
trial court's jurisdiction to enter the order in question was not raised below or
820. Id.
821. Taylor Corp., 949 So. 2d at 269-70.
822. Id. The court noted that the contract did not contain a choice of venue provision,
"[ajlthough not dispositive to this appeal." Id. at 269 n. 1.
823. Id. at 270.
824. Id. (citing Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1257 (Fla. 2002)).
825. Taylor Corp., 949 So. 2d at 270.
826. Id.
827. Id.
828. Id.
829. Id.
830. Taylor Corp., 949 So. 2d at 270.
831. Id. at270-71.
832. Id. at 271.
833. 951 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
834. See supra Part VI.A and accompanying text.
835. Hammond, 951 So. 2dat 988-89.
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on appeal, it is the duty of this [c]ourt to remain vigilant to the issue of sub-
j ect-matter jurisdiction." 836
The trial court was found to have subject matter jurisdiction with re-
spect to the specific performance aspect of the action, an in personam cause
of action. 837 However, while the trial court's summary judgment order in
Hammond that directed specific performance was approved, the summary
judgment was disapproved to the extent that it attempted to operate to trans-
fer title. 838 The trial court did not have in rem jurisdiction over the property
located in Indian River County.839 Citing the "local action rule," if a court
does not have in rem jurisdiction over the real property involved in the ac-
tion, then the court does not have jurisdiction to convey title.840 The court
ruled that if court action became necessary to enforce the order and to trans-
fer title, then it would be necessary to transfer the case to the court having in
rem jurisdiction, that court being the Circuit Court for Indian River Coun-
ty.841
D. Service of Process
In Mecca Multimedia, Inc. v. Kurzbard,842 Kurzbard alleged that he was
injured in a slip-and-fall on Mecca's premises.843 Kurzbard sued Mecca for
negligence. 8" Kurzbard tried to serve Mecca's registered agent at the
agent's address on file with the Florida Secretary of State. 845 The address
turned out to be the address of the agent's parents, "who refused to accept
service" or provide any information regarding their son, the named agent. 846
Kurzbard tried two more times "to serve an officer or employee of Mecca at"
Mecca's business address in Miami, but no one was there.8 47 Finally, Kurz-
bard resorted to substituted service on Mecca by serving the complaint on the
Secretary of State as provided in section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes. 
8
Effective substituted service on a corporation under that statute requires that
836. Id. at 988.
837. Id. at 989.
838. Id.
839. Id.
840. Hammond, 951 So. 2d at 989.
841. Id.
842. 954 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
843. Id. at 1180.
844. Id.
845. Id.
846. Id. at 1180-81.
847. Kurzbard, 954 So. 2d at 1181.
848. Id; FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (2007).
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a plaintiff plead and prove that service of the complaint in the normal way
under section 48.081 of the Florida Statutes was not possible for one of the
reasons enumerated in section 48.181; in this case, a defendant who con-
cealed his or her whereabouts. 9 Kurzbard failed to allege in his complaint
facts supporting substituted service.85 ° Substituted service was held to be
ineffective.851
E. Comity
Plaintiff sued defendant in New York for "breach of contract [and] tor-
tious interference with a business relationship." 852 Defendant instituted an
action in Florida with similar claims.853 Plaintiff moved to stay the Florida
proceeding pending the conclusion of the New York action on the ground
that the Florida action involved basically the same parties and substantially
the same issues as the New York action.854 Plaintiff also claimed that the
New York action would ultimately decide most of the claims involved in the
Florida action.855 The stay was denied because defendant's claims-brought
by defendant as the Florida plaintiff--could not be brought in New York
against certain Florida residents who were named as defendants in the Flor-
ida action.856 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed on the basis of
comity, stating that "[c]omity principles dictate that an action should be
stayed, and a trial court departs from the essential requirements of law by
failing to grant such a stay, when the first-filed lawsuit involves substantially
similar parties and substantially similar claims.
857
The Third District Court of Appeal noted that the policy discouraging
forum shopping "would be meaningless if a party could avoid the dictates of
comity [by simply] naming nominal defendants in a second-filed action. 858
While the addition of those parties would preclude an abatement of the Flor-
ida proceedings, it does not justify departure from the doctrine of comity.859
849. Kurzbard, 954 So. 2d at 1182.
850. Id.
851. Id. at 1182-83.
852. Pilevsky v. Morgans Hotel Group Mgmt., LLC, 961 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2007).
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. Id.
856. Id.
857. Pilevsky, 961 So. 2d at 1035 (citing Cuneo v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 899 So. 2d 1139,
1141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
858. Id.
859. Id.
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The court observed that if the New York case does not resolve all issues con-
cerning the Florida residents, then the Florida action may be pursued after
the New York proceedings are concluded. 6
XIV. LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A. Assignment of Lease
In Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Tropic Enterprises, Inc. 86' Tropic,
as lessor (Landlord), entered into a commercial lease with Speedway, as les-
see (Tenant).8 62 The lease agreement contained a "no assignment" clause
that required Tenant to obtain Landlord's prior written consent to Tenant's
assignment of the lease. 863 This clause provided in part that "[a]ny such as-
signment without consent shall be void, and shall, at the option of the Lessor,
terminate this lease."'8" Landlord refused to consent to the assignment, but
Tenant nonetheless assigned the lease to Sunoco, Inc.8 65 The trial court de-
termined that Landlord had the unfettered right to refuse consent and granted
summary judgment in favor of Landlord. 866
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding
that there was an implied obligation of good faith on Landlord's part not to
deny consent unreasonably.8 67 If a lease doesn't resolve an issue, or if one
party has discretion to act but no standards are set forth regarding the exer-
cise of discretion, then the obligation of good faith will be implied.8 68 Since
the lease did not resolve the question in that it did not give Tropic the abso-
lute discretion to withhold consent, and it did not contain any standard re-
garding the exercise of discretion, the obligation of good faith would be im-
plied.8 69 The implied covenant "is a gap-filling default rule" under these
circumstances. 87' The court, quoting Cox v. CSX Intermodal, Inc.,871 held
that "[w]here the terms of [a] contract afford a party substantial discretion to
860. Id. at 1036.
861. 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1032 (2d Dist. Ct. App. April 20, 2007).
862. Id.
863. Id. at D1032-33.
864. Id. at D1033.
865. Id. at D1032-33.
866. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1032.
867. Id. at D1033-34.
868. Id. at D1033 (citing Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Wilder Corp., 876 So. 2d 652, 654
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
869. Id.
870. Id. (quoting Wilder Corp., 876 So. 2d at 654).
871. 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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promote that party's self-interest, the duty to act in good faith nevertheless
limits that party's ability to act capriciously to contravene the reasonable
contractual expectations of the other party. 872
B. Renewal Options
In PL Lake Worth Corp. v. 99Cent Stuff-Palm Springs, LLC,8 73 PL Lake
Worth Corporation (Landlord) leased shopping center property to 99Cent
Stuff-Palm Springs, LLC (Tenant).8 74 The lease agreement gave Tenant an
option to renew the lease. 875 In order to make an informed decision on the
exercise of the option, Tenant needed and requested certain financial infor-
mation from Landlord well in advance of the option exercise date.8 76 The
lease agreement did not explicitly require Landlord to provide the informa-
tion and it refused to do SO. 8 77 With judicial intervention, Tenant finally ob-
tained the necessary information.8 78 Almost immediately after receiving the
information, Tenant exercised its option to renew the lease. 879 However, by
that time the option date had passed.88° Landlord sought to have the lease
declared terminated.88' The trial court ruled in favor of Tenant, holding that
Landlord breached its implied duty to act in good faith by refusing to provide
the necessary information to Tenant.882 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed citing Bowers v. Medina,883 which held that "[a]n established con-
tract principle is that a party's good-faith cooperation is an implied condition
precedent to performance of the contract." '884 On the authority of Sharp v.
Williams 885 and Cox v. CSX Intermodal, Inc.,886 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal dismissed Landlord's argument that the contract was silent and,
872. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1033 (quoting Cox, 732 So. 2d
at 1097-98).
873. 949 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
874. Id. at 1200.
875. Id.
876. Id.
877. Id.
878. PL Lake Worth Corp., 949 So. 2d at 1200-01.
879. Id. at 1201.
880. Id. at 1200.
881. Id.
882. Id. at 1201.
883. 418 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
884. PL Lake Worth Corp., 949 So. 2d at 1201 (citing Bowers, 418 So. 2d at 1069).
885. 192 So. 476 (Fla. 1939).
886. 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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therefore, there was no duty to provide the information requested by Ten-
ant. 
88 7
In Peavey v. Reynolds,88 Peavey (Landlord) leased certain commercial
property to Reynolds (Tenant). 889 Landlord claimed that provisions in the
lease agreement amounted to "an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of
property" and the lease was therefore void 9.8" The lease was upheld by the
trial court and Landlord appealed. 89' The Fifth District Court of Appeal re-
versed. 892 Under the terms of the lease agreement, Tenant had "the right to
renew the lease indefinitely at [amounts] fixed by the . . . lease" agree-
ment.893 The agreement also provided that any successor landlord would be
bound by the terms of the lease. 894 The court, citing Seagate Condo Ass 'n v.
Duff, 895 stated that restraints on alienation are a matter of public policy.896
The court observed that the lease terms gave little incentive to any landlord
to make improvements to the property.897 The court also noted that it was
highly questionable that Landlord would ever be able to sell the property
burdened as it was by the lease agreement.898 The test is one of reasonable-
ness and the Fifth District Court of Appeal, stating that the court knew of no
case directly on point, concluded that the onerous terms of the lease agree-
ment constituted an "unreasonable restraint on alienation" thereby voiding
the lease.899
In Chessmasters, Inc. v. Chamoun,9 °° the Chamouns (Landlord) leased
certain commercial property to Chessmasters, Inc., (Tenant). 91 Landlord
was the successor lessor as the result of its purchase of the property. 92
887. PL Lake Worth Corp., 949 So. 2d at 1201.
888. 946 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
889. Id. at 1126.
890. Id.
891. Id.
892. Id. at 1127.
893. Peavey, 946 So. 2d at 1127.
894. Id.
895. 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
896. Peavey, 946 So. 2d at 1126 (citing Duffy, 330 So. 2d at 485).
897. Id. at 1127.
898. Id.
899. Id. at 1127, & n. 1. The result in the case seems to be consistent with the observation
of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Old Port Cove Condominium Ass 'n One, Inc. v. Old
Port Cove Holdings, Inc., regarding the impact a fixed price for the right of first refusal for an
unlimited time may have had on the outcome of the case. 954 So. 2d 742, 746 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); see also supra note 547 and accompanying text.
900. 948 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
901. Id. at 986.
902. Id.
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Landlord sought to have the lease agreement declared void on the grounds
that certain provisions granted to Tenant in the lease agreement amounted to
"an unreasonable restraint on alienation."9 3  The trial court agreed with
Landlord that the lease could be renewed by Tenant in perpetuity and de-
clared the lease void. 9°4 Tenant then appealed.9 5 The offending lease re-
newal provision allowed for the automatic renewal of the lease for five addi-
tional years unless the Tenant gave the Landlord timely notice of non-
renewal.9"6 If the lease was renewed rent would increase by "not more than
10% current rental price. 9 °7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
before a renewal right could be said to be perpetual and an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation, the lease agreement had to contain a clear and explicit
right to perpetual renewals.9"8 The subject lease agreement did not so
state.9"9 Therefore, the renewal right could not be said to be perpetual."'
The court had to grapple with the fact that likewise, renewals were not ex-
pressly limited by the agreement. 91' How many renewals does the Tenant
get? The court, citing Schroeder v. Johnson,912 said only two. 91 3 However,
unlike the lessee in Schroeder, Tenant gets only one extension because the
lease refers to "period" in the singular, whereas the lease in Schroeder re-
ferred to "periods," allowing the grant of two extensions. 9 4
C. Restrictive Covenants
Winn-Dixie (Tenant) was the "anchor" tenant at Crest Haven Shopping
Plaza (Landlord).9"5 Tenant's lease with Landlord gave Tenant "the exclu-
sive right to sell groceries" in the shopping center, subject to one excep-
tion. 916 The exception allowed other stores to sell groceries in a space no
larger than 500 square feet.917 The lease also provided that Landlord's ex-
903. Id. at 985.
904. Id. at 986.
905. Chamoun, 948 So. 2d at 985.
906. Id. at 986.
907. Id.
908. Id. at 987.
909. Id.
910. Chamoun, 948 So. 2d at 987.
911. See id
912. 696 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
913. See Chamoun, 948 So. 2d at 987 (citing Schroder, 696 So. 2d at 499).
914. Id. at 987-88.
915. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 964 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
916. Id. at 263.
917. Id.
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clusive right was deemed to be a covenant running with the land.918 A short
form version of the lease was recorded in the Palm Beach County public
records.919 Dolgencorp then opened a Dollar General Store in the shopping
center and began selling groceries from an area larger than 500 square
feet. 920 Tenant sued Dolgencorp and Landlord, and the trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of Dolgencorp.92' Tenant appealed, and Dolgen-
corp argued that Tenant's exclusive right was not binding on Dolgencorp
because Dolgencorp was not a party to the lease agreement between Tenant
and Landlord. 922 Ruling in favor of Tenant, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal determined that Tenant's exclusive right was a covenant running with
the land and enforceable against Dolgencorp. 923 The court defined an "en-
forceable covenant running with the land" as a covenant: 1) "that touches
and involves the land;" 2) that was created intentionally; and 3) notice of
which is given to "the party against whom enforcement is sought., 924 Based
on the record, the court found that Tenant satisfied the first two criteria but
had a little more difficulty ruling that the third requirement, the notice re-
quirement, had been satisfied. 925 Stating that notice can be constructive, ac-
tual, or implied actual, the Fourth District Court of Appeal determined that
Dolgencorp had "at least implied actual notice" of Tenant's exclusive
right. 926 The court based its conclusion on the fact that "Dolgencorp was an
experienced commercial tenant" that had many of its sites in shopping cen-
ters, and it had a duty to inquire further.927 In fact, Dolgencorp insisted on
"exclusive[] [rights] in its own leases. 928 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal also concluded that Dolgencorp had constructive notice, relying on sec-
tions 28.222(3)(a), 695.11, and 695.0 1(1) of the Florida Statutes.9 29 A lease
is "one kind of instrument that the clerk... is required to record" and there-
fore, it is notice under Section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes when it is "of-
ficially recorded." 93° For purposes of section 695.01(1) of the Florida Stat-
918. Id.
919. Id.
920. Dolgencorp, 964 So. 2d at 263.
921. Id. Dolgencorp sought an injunction, specific performance, and damages. Id. There
was also a claim of unjust enrichment. Id..
922. Id. The Landlord was involved in this appeal and claims against it remained unre-
solved. Dolgencorp, 964 So. 2d at 263.
923. Id at 264.
924. Id. at 265.
925. Id.
926. Idat 266..
927. Id.
928. Dolgencorp, 964 So. 2d at 266.
929. Id. at 266-67.
930. Id.
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utes, "which describes the effect of recording a lease," the court concluded
that "a lessee of real property is a 'purchaser' and "a recorded lease 'shall be
good and effectual' against subsequent purchasers for value."93'
In Autozone Stores, Inc. v. Northeast Plaza Venture, LLC.,932 the retail
lease agreement between Northeast Plaza Venture, LLC (Landlord) and Au-
tozone Stores, Inc. (Tenant) identified and designated certain unoccupied
areas in the shopping center as being reserved "for the exclusive joint use of
all tenants. 933  Landlord later decided to develop part of the designated
property.934 Landlord filed a declaratory judgment action, alleging that Ten-
ant threatened "to enjoin the sale of the [parcels] or to prevent construction"
on the site.935 Landlord sought and was granted the determination that Ten-
ant had no right to injunctive relief because Tenant had "an adequate remedy
at law in the form of mone[y] damages. '"936 Tenant appealed, and the Second
District Court of Appeal reversed. 937 The absence of an adequate remedy at
law is not a condition precedent to enjoining the violation of a restrictive
covenant.938 This rule applies in commercial real estate contexts as well as
residential. 939 Every piece of land has a peculiar value.94°
931. Id. Another issue presented in the case was whether Tenant's exclusive right violated
the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, section 542.335 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 267-68. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that section inapplicable to covenants running with the
land. Dolgencorp, 964 So. 2d at 267-68.
932. 934 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
933. Id. at 672.
934. Id.
935. Id.
936. Id.
937. Autozone Stores, Inc., 934 So. 2d at 672, 675.
938. Id. at 673.
939. Id. at 674. Two of the three cases upon which the Second District Court of Appeal
relied addressed restrictive covenants involving setbacks in residential developments. Id. at
673-674; see also Stephl v. Moore, 114 So. 455 (Fla. 1927); Daniel v. May, 143 So. 2d 536
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962). The third case involved a commercial tenant. Autozone Stores,
Inc., 934 So. 2d at 674; see also Jack Eckerd Corp. v. 17070 Collins Ave. Shopping Ctr., Ltd.,
563 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
940. The landlord relied on an earlier Third District Court of Appeal decision, Liza Dan-
ielle, Inc. v. Jamko, Inc., 408 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), where, in a dispute
involving a commercial lease, injunctive relief was denied. Autozone Stores, Inc., 934 So. 2d
at 674. The Second District Court of Appeal, in Autozone Stores, Inc., distinguished Jamko
without acknowledging agreement with the holding there, reasoning that the Jamko case was
more in the nature of a non-compete clause rather than a real property restrictive covenant. Id.
at 674-75. The Third District, in deciding Jack Eckerd Corp., similarly distinguished the
facts in Jack Eckerd Corp. from its earlier decision in Jamko. Id. at 674.
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D. Taxes
Wellington Realty Co. (Landlord) entered into a build-to-suit lease with
ColorAll Technologies International, Inc. (Tenant) in 2000."41 Landlord fin-
ished construction of the leased premises near the end of 2001 and Tenant
occupied the premises on December 20, 2001.942 Tenant was obligated to
pay any real estate tax increase "after the base year of occupancy."943 The
real estate tax was $23,000 in 2001 and $32,300 in 2002. 944 Tenant paid its
rent for 2002 in addition to "a pro-rated amount for [its] eleven days [of oc-
cupancy] in 2001." However, Tenant refused to pay the almost $9300 real
estate tax increase, claiming that 2002, not 2001, was the base year of occu-
pancy.946 The real estate tax increase was clearly due to the post-
improvement value of the property assessed January 1, 2002. 9 4' Tenant was
in possession under a 2001 certificate of occupancy, and the property "was
'substantially completed' in 2001. '  Under these facts, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, in Wellington Realty Co., had no difficulty determining that
the base year of occupancy was 2001 . 949 The court distinguished the facts
from those in Handelsman v. Royal Trust Bank of Palm Beach, N.A., 950
where the property was not substantially completed during the year of first
possession, and the second year of possession was held to be the base year. 951
The court also stated "that Handelsman did not [create] a bright-line" test. 952
XV. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
In Carnes v. Fender,953 Mr. and Mrs. Carnes obtained a $3 million jury
verdict against Great Harbour Cay Realty. 954 Unable to collect the judgment,
941. Wellington Realty Co. v. ColorAll Techs. Int'l, Inc., 951 So. 2d 921, 921 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
942. Id. at 922-23.
943. Id. at 921-22.
944. Id. at 923.
945. Id. at 922.
946. Wellington Realty Co., 951 So. 2d at 922.
947. See id. at 923.
948. Id.
949. Id.
950. 426 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
951. Wellington Realty Co., 951 So. 2d at 922-923.
952. Id. at 923.
953. 936 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
954. Id. at 13; see also Great Harbour Cay Realty & Inv. Co. v. Carnes, 862 So. 2d 63, 65
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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they sued Mr. Fender, the principal of Great Harbour.955 Mr. and Mrs.
Carnes alleged that at one time Great Harbour was worth $30 million.956
They also alleged that Mr. Fender was the sole shareholder of Great Harbour,
made all corporate decisions, depleted Great Harbour's assets to defeat their
claim, and used Great Harbour "as a sham to defraud investors." '957 Mr.
Fender moved for summary judgment and conflicting evidence bearing on
the plaintiffs' allegations was filed with the court.95 The trial court granted
the motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed.959
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, noting that
summary judgments are rare in fraudulent conveyance cases.960 The evi-
dence presented on this issue by Mr. Fender conflicted with evidence pre-
sented by Mr. and Mrs. Carnes.96' Only "the scintilla of appreciable evi-
dence [is] required to defeat a motion for summary judgment." 962 There was
also conflicting evidence on the issue of the ability to pierce the corporate
veil. 963 Summary judgment was inappropriate as a jury could reasonably
have drawn an inference favoring Mr. and Mrs. Carnes from the evidence
presented.964
In Priskie v. Missry,965 Priskie and his wife owned forty percent of
EXA. 966 From time to time, Priskie made capital contributions to EXA to
keep it going.967 Tiring of this, Priskie asked Missry, another shareholder,
for a $20,000 loan to EXA. 968 Missry made the loan, although there was no
contemporaneous documentation of the loan. 9 69 Loan proceeds were used
for corporate purposes, and "EXA's board of directors" ratified the loan and
EXA's obligation to repay Missry.97° When EXA defaulted, Missry sought
to hold both EXA and Priskie liable.97 The trial court ruled in favor of Mis-
955. Fender, 936 So. 2d at 13.
956. Id.
957. Id.
958. Id.
959. Id. at 12.
960. Fender, 936 So. 2d at 14-15.
961. Id. at 14.
962. Id.
963. Id. at 15.
964. Id.
965. 958 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
966. Id. at 614.
967. Id. at 615.
968. Id. at 614.
969. Id.
970. Priskie, 958 So. 2d at 615.
971. Id. at 614.
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sry, and both EXA and Priskie appealed.91 2  The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that the corporate veil could not be pierced to im-
pose liability on Priskie even though Priskie was instrumental in obtaining
the loan. 973 In order for Missry to prevail, he would have to prove that: 1)
the corporation had no independent existence-the corporation's sharehold-
ers being its alter egos; 2) the corporation was "used fraudulently or for an
improper purpose[s]"; and 3) "the [fraud] or improper use of the" corporation
caused Missry's injury. 9 74 Missry failed to meet his burden of proof.9 75
XVI. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
In Huffinan v. Breezes Full Service Car Wash,976 the car wash was
closed because of rain, and Cash, one of Breezes' owners, took several of the
employees of the car wash out to lunch9 77 Lackowski, another manager, was
also there.9 78 Alcoholic beverages were consumed during lunch. 979 After
lunch, Lackowski was involved in car accident.9 0 Melissa Jones, the driver
of the other car, was killed.98" ' Her son, who was a passenger in her car, was
injured., 982 The personal representatives of the estate of Mrs. Jones sued
Breezes for wrongful death, 983 "alleging that Breezes was vicariously liable
for [the] negligent acts committed by" its employees. 984 In support of its
motion for summary judgment, Breezes argued "that it could not be vicari-
ously liable for the alleged negligence" of its employees because the facts
demonstrated that the employees "ceased acting within the scope of their
employment" before the lunch.985  The trial court agreed and granted the
motion. 986 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that "the
972. Id.
973. Id. at 615.
974. Id. at 614 (citing Seminole Boatyard, Inc. v. Christoph, 715 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
975. Priskie, 958 So. 2d at 615.
976. 956 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
977. Id. at 1204.
978. Id.
979. Id.
980. Id.
981. Huffinan, 956 So. 2dat 1204.
982. Id.
983. Id. at 1204-05.
984. Id. at 1205.
985. Id.
986. Huffinan, 956 So. 2d at 1205.
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trial court improperly resolved disputed issues of fact" on the scope of em-
ployment question where the record showed disputed issues of fact. 
987
In Palafrugell Holdings, Inc. v. Cassel,98 the Third District Court of
Appeal considered exceptions to the rule that a third party may rely on the
apparent authority of an agent. 989 In this legal malpractice case, the attorney
was dealing with a long-standing client, Hernandez-the agent-in connec-
tion with the attorney's representation of a new client, Palafrugell Holdings,
Inc.-the principal. 99  Palafrugell Holdings, Inc.-through Hernandez-
hired an attorney to represent the corporation in purchasing a "50% interest
in a mortgage [from] AAX, Inc." 99' Hernandez also secured investors and
arranged the mortgage purchase by Palafrugell Holdings, Inc., all with the
knowledge of the investors that he had secured.992 Hernandez claimed to be
a majority shareholder of Palafrugell Holdings, Inc. 9 93 There was no ques-
tion that Hernandez had the authority to hire the attorney as corporate coun-
sel for Palafrugell Holdings, Inc. 994 The investors wired $350,000 of pur-
chase funds to the attorney's trust account.9 5 Hernandez directed the attor-
ney to prepare a mortgage assignment in Hernandez's name alone, and to
disburse the purchase funds to several payees, including $43,375 to Hernan-
dez to repay advances. 996 Hernandez was not an officer or director of the
corporation, but the attorney complied with Hernandez's directions without
obtaining the consent of, or confirmation from, an officer of Palafrugell
Holdings, Inc. 997 The attorney argued, and the trial court agreed, that Her-
nandez, as the corporation's agent, had at least apparent authority to direct
the attorney as he did.998 The Third District Court of Appeal, recognizing
that "' [t]he acts of an agent, performed within the scope of his real or appar-
ent authority, are binding upon his principal,' 999 stated that there are cir-
cumstances where failure to make further inquiry into the agent's authority
may preclude reliance on the agent's representations. 0  One situation
987. Id.
988. 940 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
989. Id. at 494.
990. Id. at 493. There were also causes of action alleging "negligent bailment" and
"breach of fiduciary duty arising out of negligent disbursement of trust funds." Id.
991. Id.
992. Palafrugell, 940 So. 2d at 493.
993. Id.
994. Id. at 493-94.
995. Id. at 493.
996. Id. at 493, 494 n.2.
997. Palafrugell, 940 So. 2d at 493-94.
998. See id. at 494.
999. Id. (quoting Indus. Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 So. 2d 23, 26 (Fla. 1952)).
1000. Id.
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where there may be a duty to inquire further, is where an agent directs acts
by the third-party that, on their face, are contrary to the interests of the prin-
cipal.' °
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that summary
judgment in favor of the attorney was improper. 100 2 The trial court failed to
consider whether Hernandez's actions should have raised a reasonable doubt
as to the extent of Hernandez's authority and prompted the attorney to in-
quire further. 003
XVII. TAXES
In Geiger v. Commissioner,"'°4 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) de-
termined a deficiency in Mr. Geiger's 2000 federal income tax of $159,008
and, pursuant to Section 6662(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, also assessed
an accuracy related penalty of $31,802."°5 Mr. Geiger's "S" corporation
reported a theft loss of $1,645,986, which was passed through to Mr. Geiger
and claimed by him as a deduction on his individual income tax return pur-
suant to section 165(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. 10 6 On audit, the IRS
allowed a theft loss of $5586, which resulted in the deficiency and the pen-
alty. 07 Mr. Geiger was required to establish that a theft, within the meaning
of section 165, had occurred and the amount of the loss.1008 The question of
.whether the actions alleged to have occurred constituted a theft turned on the
definition of the crime under Florida law.'00 9 The Tax Court held that Mr.
Geiger failed to prove that a theft occurred under section 812.014 of the
Florida Statutes. 'o"0 As the trier of fact, the United States Tax Court upheld
the deficiency, finding Mr. Geiger's explanation of the theft loss to be in-
credible.' 0" The IRS has the burden of proving that the accuracy-related
penalty is appropriate. 12 In this case, because of Mr. Geiger's loss deduc-
1001. Id.
1002. Palafrugell, 940 So. 2d at 495.
1003. Id. at 494.
1004. 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 510 (2006).
1005. Id.
1006. Id. at 513.
1007. Id.
1008. Id. at 513.
1009. Geiger, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 513 (citing Monteleone v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 688, 692
(1960)).
1010. Id.
1011. Id.
1012. Id. at 514 (citing I.R.C. § 7491(c) (2000)).
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tion, Mr. Geiger paid no income tax for 2000.1013 The 20% accuracy related
penalty is appropriate if the tax is underpaid by more than the greater of ei-
ther 10% of the tax due or $5000."°14 Having not paid anything, Mr. Geiger
"qualified" for the penalty.1015 The penalty can be avoided if the taxpayer
can show reasonable cause for the tax amount, if any, paid. 1016 Mr. Geiger
claimed that he relied on the information provided to him by his then
wife. 1017 However, his wife had no bookkeeping experience.1018 Under the
circumstances, it was unreasonable for Mr. Geiger to not consult an account-
ant or other tax professional, and the penalty was upheld. 019
The Florida annual intangible tax for individuals, businesses, and per-
sonal representatives has, with limited exceptions, been repealed, effective
January 1, 2007.1020 The exceptions cover leases of government owned
property 1021 and a one-time intangible tax where notes are secured by mort-
gages on Florida real property. 0 22 All obligations for years before 2007 re-
main in full force and effect subject to prior laws and rules regarding assess-
ment and collection. 1
023
XVIII. TORTS
A. Negligence, Products Liability, and Strict Liability
In a case of first impression, Vincent v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 1024 the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal concluded that a designer of a product may be
liable to foreseeable users of a product, even if the designer does not have
any subsequent involvement with the product.0 25 The court saw no distinc-
tion between a designer who is the manufacturer and a designer who is not
1013. Id.
1014. Geiger, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 514 (citing I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (2000)).
1015. Id.
1016. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2000)).
1017. Id.
1018. Id.
1019. Geiger, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 514.
1020. FLA. STAT. §§ 199.012, .023, .032, .033, .042, .052, .057, .062, .103, .1055, .106,
.175, .185 (2005), repealed by Act effective Jan. 1, 2007, ch. 2006-312, § 1, 2006 Fla. Laws
3167.
1021. FLA. STAT. § 196.199(2)(b) (2007).
1022. Id. § 199.133(1).
1023. Id. § 199.303(3).
1024. 944 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
1025. Id. at 1086. The trial court was unable to find that Bard was also a manufacturer. Id.
at 1085.
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the manufacturer. 1126  Where the designer is also the manufacturer, under
existing Florida law, the designer has a duty to all foreseeable users, as well
as intended users, to exercise reasonable care in the design of the product. 1027
However, with respect to the situation where the designer is not the manufac-
turer, the court could find no Florida case directly on point. 1 28 Thus, the
question, as framed by the Second District Court of Appeal, was whether or
not "a designer of a product who did not manufacture, sell, distribute or have
any other involvement in getting the product to the user may be liable in neg-
ligence for the defective design of the product." 10 29 The action in Vincent
was instituted after the plaintiff's son received an overdose from a patient
controlled morphine pump while in the hospital. 10 30 The overdose left the
son "totally and permanently disabled."'0'" No record was made of the
amount of morphine remaining in the pump, and "the pump permanently
disappeared while in the custody of the hospital."'132 The plaintiff sued C.R.
Bard, Inc. (Bard) and Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter) alleging negli-
gent design of the pump. 1033 It was undisputed that either Bard or Baxter was
the manufacturer of the pump used by the plaintiffs son."34 Plaintiff also
sued Bard for negligent design of the pump. 1035 With respect to this claim, it
was clear that Bard had designed the pump, even though it could not be de-
termined who had manufactured the particular pump. 1 36 The trial court en-
tered summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants, and the plaintiff
appealed. 10
37
The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment was properly
granted on the negligent design issue in favor of Baxter and Bimeco, the
distributor who was also named as a defendant, since the pump could not be
1026. Id. at 1085.
1027. Id. at 1086 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 1981)); see
also Light v. Weldarc Co., 569 So. 2d 1302, 1303 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1028. Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1085.
1029. Id.
1030. Id.
1031. Id.
1032. Id.
1033. Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1084-85.
1034. Id. at 1085. Baxter had taken over the division of Bard that had designed and manu-
factured the pumps, so it could not be determined which of the two companies actually manu-
factured the missing pump. Id.
1035. Id.
1036. Id.
1037. Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1085. The distributor of the pump, Bimeco, Inc. was also a
named defendant, and the summary judgment was also granted to this defendant on the same
grounds. Id.
[Vol. 32
82
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss1/3
FLORIDA LA W AFFECTING BUSINESS 0WNERS
found."38 However, as to Bard, the designer, the court disagreed.0 39 The
court noted that a manufacturer, who is also the designer, is under a duty to
foreseeable users to exercise reasonable care in the design of the product. 0" 0
The court could find no reason why the designer of a product who is not also
the manufacturer should, for that reason, be relieved of liability to foresee-
able users if the product was negligently designed.'"' The plaintiffs son
was a foreseeable user.' 2 With respect to the negligent design claim, the
absence of the particular pump was not an insurmountable obstacle in light
of an unopposed affidavit submitted by the plaintiff's expert, that in his opin-
ion, the overdose was the result of a design error. 043
In Saullo v. Douglas,"°44 Mr. Douglas owned the tractor part of a
tractor-trailer rig.'045 Dart Transit Company (Dart), an interstate motor car-
rier, owned the trailer. 0" 6 Mr. Douglas agreed to permanently lease the trac-
tor to Dart, and to drive the tractor exclusively to carry freight in trailers
owned by Dart. 047 The operating agreement between Mr. Douglas and Dart
described Mr. Douglas as an independent contractor.' 8 While driving the
rig for Dart in central Florida, Douglas responded to a call for help from his
brother.0 49 Mr. Douglas detached the trailer from the tractor and, leaving the
trailer parked in the far right-hand lane, left the tractor to assist his broth-
er.0 50 In the early morning hours, Mr. Saullo, who was driving to his
friend's apartment, swerved to avoid the trailer, hit a tree, and was killed. 1051
The court stated that Mr. Saullo was intoxicated, and that he was not wearing
a seatbelt when the accident occurred. 0 52 Mr. Saullo's personal representa-
1038. Id. Although not specifically stated, presumably the affirmance of the summary
judgment on the issue of negligent design applies to Bard as well. See id. at 1085-86.
1039. Id. at 1085.
1040. Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1085.
1041. Id.
1042. Id. at 1086.
1043. Id. The court noted that there was still, therefore, a genuine issue of material fact-
"whether Bard breached its duty to" plaintiffs son. Id. The court did not address what impact
the fact that the affidavit was uncontroverted might have on the breach of duty issue. See
Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1086. In any event, there presumably is also still the issue of proximate
cause. See id.
1044. 957 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1045. Id. at 82.
1046. Id.
1047. Id.
1048. Id.
1049. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 82.
1050. Id.
1051. Id.
1052. Id.
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tive alleged liability on Dart's part by reason of federal regulations governing
interstate trucking, and alternatively, that the principle of respondeat superior
applied to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. 0 53 The trial court rejected
both theories and granted summary judgment in favor of Dart. 1054
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal observed that two lines
of decisions had developed on the effect of pertinent federal regulations "on
state tort law in negligence actions.""" One was a strict agency/lease liabil-
ity paradigm, and the second was an application of "a state law respondeat
superior/'scope of employment' analysis."' 10 56 Finding the choice between
the two theories a matter of first impression in Florida, the Fifth District held
that the better approach was respondeat superior/scope of employment.
10 57
Clearly, Mr. Douglas acted outside the scope of employment regarding the
trailer. 05 8 The negligent use of a dangerous instrumentality by the agent,
even if not within the scope of the agent's employment, can result in vicari-
ous liability to the principal.' 059 The court noted that "[i]t is well-established
in Florida.. .that the trailer [part] of the tractor-trailer rig [has been held] not
[to be] a dangerous instrumentality.'°6° However, the tractor was a danger-
ous instrumentality." 0 61 The court found that Dart, "owner of the trailer and
• ..lessee of the tractor," put "Douglas in operational control of both,"
thereby subjecting it to vicarious liability. 1061 The court used the analogy of
a dump truck that negligently deposited a load of gravel on the roadway re-
sulting in injury to another driver, as to which the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine would apply. 10 63 The court said that "[j]ust because the trailer was
dropped off rather than a load of stones should not change that result." 1064
Finding that the "case present[ed] an issue of causation," the court reversed
and remanded the matter to the trial court.'065
In Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Utilities, InC., 1066 Atlanta Gas Light
Company (Atlanta Gas) and the City of St. Augustine settled a pollution li-
1053. Id.
1054. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 82.
1055. Id. at 85.
1056. Id.
1057. Id. at 86.
1058. Id.
1059. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 86.
1060. Id. at 87.
1061. Id. at 88.
1062. Id. at 87.
1063. Id. at 88.
1064. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 88.
1065. Id.
1066. 463 F.3d 1201 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
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ability claim with the Environmental Protection Agency under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA).1067 Atlanta Gas instituted suit against UGI Utilities, Inc. (UGI)
and Center Point Energy Resources Corporation (Center Point) seeking con-
tribution. 10 68 The polluted land at issue had accommodated an energy pro-
ducing plant since 1886.1169 UGI and Center Point were successors to parent
corporations that, at various times, controlled subsidiaries operating the
plant. 1070 Under CERCLA, liability-and claims for contribution- for envi-
ronmental pollution can be asserted against "owners" of the damaged prop-
erty and "operators" of pollution causing facilities.' 0 7' Atlanta Gas did not
assert ownership liability against UGI and Center Point because the prede-
cessor corporations never owned the land involved. 107' Atlanta Gas claimed
that the predecessor corporations operated the pollution causing facilities by
virtue of their subsidiary operators. 1073 The court, relying on the test created
by United States v. Bestfoods10 74 to determine if the parent corporation is in
fact the operator of its subsidiary's pollution-causing facility, stated that the
parent must have "manage[d], direct[ed], or conduct[ed] operations specifi-
cally related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with the leakage or
disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environ-
mental regulations."' 1 75 Under this test, the parent may be subject to liability
if: 1) the parent actually operated the facility alone or jointly with the sub-
sidiary; 2) a person serving as an officer or director of the subsidiary and
parent is serving only the parent; or 3) an agent of the parent is placed with
the subsidiary to conduct operations. 1076 Atlanta Gas was unable to prove the
defendants "passed" the test. 1077
An interesting issue in the case was the liability of the defendant insur-
ance company, Century Indemnity Company (Century). 1 78  Century had
issued indemnity policies to the subsidiaries for five years during the period
from 1940-1947. 1079 The policies covered damage to the property caused by
1067. Id. at 1202.
1068. Id. at 1203.
1069. Id. at 1202.
1070. Id. at 1202-03, nn.1-2.
1071. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1204.
1072. Id.
1073. Id. at 1204-05.
1074. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
1075. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1204-05 (quoting Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67).
1076. Id. at 1205 n.6.
1077. See id.
1078. Id. at 1208.
1079. Id.
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accident.18 "'Accident' [was] not defined in the policy."'0 81  The court
noted that there was no evidence of contamination during policy coverage
periods.°12 There was expert testimony to the effect there must have been
routine leakages and contaminants during the coverage period. 1083 However,
routine leakages are not accidents-they are not unintentional, unexpected
events. 1084 No liability was imposed on the insurance company. 108'
B. Misrepresentation and Fraud
In Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.,18 6 Sun-
beam, Inc. (Sunbeam), "[p]ursuant to [a] merger agreement, . . . bought the
Coleman [Company, Inc.] stock" owned by Coleman (Parent) Holdings,
Inc. 87 Sunbeam paid Parent "approximately half of the purchase price"
with Sunbeam stock.10 88 The Sunbeam stock Parent received had an "esti-
mated value of over $600 million."'1 89 "The transaction closed on March 30,
1998." 1090 Parent was subject to a "lockup" restriction in the agreement."'
Parent could only sell the Sunbeam stock in increments over time and could
not have sold all of it until 270 days after the transaction closed. 19 2 The
average per share price for Sunbeam from the time Sunbeam's deal with
Parent publicly disclosed was $48.26.1093 Parent had acquired 14.1 million
shares.' 94 Almost immediately after the closing, bad news about Sunbeam
began arriving.1°9  In April 1998, on poor sales reports, the stock price
dropped to $34 per share. 0 96 In June 1998, fraudulent bookkeeping was
alleged, and the stock fell to $18 per share. 197 Arthur Anderson, Sunbeam's
1080. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1208.
1081. Id.
1082. Id.
1083. Id. at 1209.
1084. Id. at 1210.
1085. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1210.
1086. 955 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1087. Id. at 1126.
1088. Id.
1089. Id.
1090. Id.
1091. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1126.
1092. Id.
1093. Id. at 1127.
1094. Id.
1095. Id. at 1126.
1096. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1126.
1097. Id.
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accountant, revoked its audit certificates for 1996 and 1997.1098 Parent was
unable to sell its Sunbeam stock even after the lockup because Arthur Ander-
son's actions had delayed having the stock registered for sale to the pub-
lic.' 099 Registration "could not be completed until late 1999." 1°" ° On Febru-
ary 6, 2001, Sunbeam went bankrupt and its shares became worthless. 10 '
Parent sued Morgan Stanley claiming that Morgan Stanley, Sunbeam's in-
vestment banker, helped Sunbeam carry out a "fraudulent scheme to inflate
the price of [Sunbeam] stock until after the merger."' 10 2 The trial court de-
nied Morgan Stanley's motion for a directed verdict, and the jury returned a
verdict against Morgan Stanley for conspiracy and fraud."0 3  The jury
awarded Parent $604,334,000 in compensatory damages and $850 million in
punitive damages."'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded "with di-
rections to enter judgment for Morgan Stanley. '105 The court observed that
"the flexibility theory of damages" is the law in Florida with respect to
fraud."0 6 This theory allows a trial "court to use either the 'out-of-pocket'
[rule] or the 'benefit-of-the-bargain' rule, depending [on] which is more like-
ly to fully compensate the injured party.""0 7 The trial court, at Parent's re-
quest, used the benefit-of-the-bargain rule. 11
08
Damages are then "measured by the difference between the value of the
property as represented and the actual value of the property on the date of the
transaction.""0 9 Determining actual value is essential to arriving at a dam-
ages amount."' 0 The court found that Parent's expert on damages failed to
opine on "the 'fraud-free' price of Sunbeam stock on the . . . closing"
date."".. This required "event study" or "event analysis" to consider the eco-
nomic effect each particular event might have had on the stock price, not just
the effect of the alleged fraud."' 2  This type of analysis was not con-
1098. Id.
1099. Id.
1100. Id.
1101. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1127.
1102. Id. at 1125-26.
1103. Id. at 1126.
1104. Id. at 1127-28.
1105. Id. at 1133.
1106. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1128 (internal quotations omitted).
1107. Id. (quoting Nordyne, Inc. v. Fla. Mobile Home Supply, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1283, 1286
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
1108. Id.
1109. Id.
1110. Id.
1111. MorganStanley& Co.,955 So. 2dat 1127.
1112. Id. at 1130.
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ducted. "3 Parent argued that the fraud-free value of the stock on the closing
date did not matter because it could not have sold any of the stock on that
day.i"'4 It also argued that it should be allowed to collect damages measured
by the decline in stock value from the closing date until it could first have
been resold after December 1999.1115 The court was not persuaded."' 6 "The
bargain, in this case, included sale restrictions."' 17 Absent proof of the
fraud-free value of Sunbeam on the transaction, the jury's damage award
could not be correct. 1118 Parent was not entitled to a new trial.'' 9 It had a
chance to prove correct damages and failed.".2  On the issue of punitive
damages, the court ruled that the verdict could not stand where "no legally
cognizable damage was shown as a result of the alleged fraud." 2'' . Judge
Shahood concurred without opinion." 22  Judge Farmer dissented with an
opinion. 2
C. Slander and False Light Invasion of Privacy
The next two cases, false light invasion of privacy cases, are pending in
the Supreme Court of Florida. "24 According to the renowned torts professor,
Dean William Prosser, a category of the invasion of privacy tort is "false
light. ' 125 False light is said to be different from defamation in that the ob-
jectionable false light in which a person is put by the tortfeasor "may be
based on a statement that is not defamatory."". 126 In this case, Mr. Anderson
complained of articles about him that appeared in the Pensacola News-
Journal between December 13, 1998, and July 12, 2000.1127 Mr. Anderson
1113. Id.
1114. Id. at 1128-29.
1115. Id. at 1129.
1116. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1129.
1117. Id.
1118. Id. at 1131.
1119. Id.
1120. Id.
1121. MorganStanley&Co.,955 So. 2dat 1132.
1122. Id. at 1133 (Shahood, J., concurring).
1123. Id. (Farmer, J., dissenting).
1124. Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 944 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006), appeal
docketed, No. SC06-2491 (Fla. Dec. 20, 2006); Gannett Co. v. Anderson, 947 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006), appeal docketed, No. SC06-2174 (Fla. Nov. 11, 2006). Both cases
have been rescheduled for oral argument on March 6, 2008. Order at 2, Jews for Jesus, Inc. v.
Rapp, No. SC06-2491 (Fla. Sept. 26, 2007).
1125. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 4.
1126. Id.
1127. Id. at 2.
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admitted that the articles were factually correct but the December 14, 1998,
article was written so as to put him in the "false light" in that it "it falsely
implied that he had murdered his wife and gotten away with it.""128 His first
complaint, filed on March 21, 2001, brought an action "for libel and tortious
interference with a business relationship."' 29 Mr. Anderson amended his
complaint "to include a ... claim for invasion of privacy based on the false
light theory."" 3  Some of the articles, including the December 14, 1998,
article, were subject to the two-year defamation statute of limitations under
section 95.11 (4)(g) of the Florida Statutes."3' "The libel and tortious inter-
ference claims were voluntarily dismissed ... ... However, relying on
Heekin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.,"33 Mr. Anderson argued that unlike defa-
mation, a false light invasion of privacy action was an unspecified tort that
was subject to the four-year statute of limitations found in section
95.11 (3)(p) of the Florida Statutes and would thus bring the 1998 article
back into the litigation.' '3' The trial court agreed, and the case went to the
jury on the invasion of privacy count only.' 3 The jury awarded Mr. Ander-
son $18,280,000 in compensatory damages." 36 The issue raised on appeal
by Gannett was whether the statute of limitations was two years or four
years."137 The First District Court of Appeal observed that thus far in Flor-
ida, only the Second District Court of Appeal in Heekin had recognized a
false light invasion of privacy action."38 The court concluded that the Su-
preme Court of Florida has not directly held that this tort is cognizable in
Florida. " 39 The court then conducted an extensive review of the law of other
states and pointed out that North Carolina refuses to recognize false light as a
tort."114  The court essentially found that defamation actions and false light
claims are virtually indistinguishable and therefore the false light claim
should be "subject to the two-year statute" of limitation.'4" The court was
1128. Id.at3.
1129. Id. 2.
1130. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 2.
1131. Id. at 4, 7; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(g) (2007). Section 95.11(4)(g) places a
two-year limitation to bring an action for libel or slander. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (4)(g).
1132. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 3.
1133. 789 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
1134. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 4 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(p) (2006)); see also Hee-
kin, 789 So. 2d at 358.
1135. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 3.
1136. Id. at 1.
1137. Id. at 3-4.
1138. Id. at 7.
1139. Id. at6.
1140. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 4-5.
1141. Id. at 7.
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also concerned with the ease with which a plaintiff could avoid the two year
statute of limitation simply by making a false light invasion of privacy
claim.. 42 Conflict with Heekin was acknowledged, and the First District
Court of Appeal certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida: "Is an action for invasion of privacy based on the false light theory
governed by the two-year statute of limitations that applies to defamation
claims or by the four-year statute that applies to unspecified tort claims?""'1 43
Judge Lewis concurred in the result only. 1'
About a month after Gannett was decided, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal issued its opinion in Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. 1145 Mrs. Rapp's
stepson, Bruce Rapp, was employed by Jews for Jesus.1146 In a Jews for Je-
sus newsletter published on the internet, Bruce claimed that Mrs. Rapp had
converted from Judaism to Christianity. 147 A relative of Mrs. Rapp saw the
newsletter and informed her of what it said."4 Mrs. Rapp sued Jews for
Jesus and after several amendments to her complaint, there remained counts
for false light invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent train-
ing and supervision. 1149 The trial court dismissed the complaint on First
Amendment grounds."5  On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
upheld the dismissal of all counts except the false light invasion of privacy
claim and the negligent training and supervision claim.' 1' 1 The court said
that the lower court mistakenly applied the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 1 52 The First Amendment bars "'courts from resolving
internal church disputes [requiring application] of religious doctrine."""' It
does not apply to "'disputes between churches and third parties.' 1154
The court made fairly short work of Mrs. Rapp's defamation and emo-
tional distress claims.' 1 The newsletter was held not to be defamatory be-
cause it "was intended for group members who would have" taken the news
1142. Id. at 8.
1143. Id. at 11.
1144. Id. (Lewis, J., concurring).
1145. 944 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
1146. Id. at 462.
1147. Id.
1148. Id.
1149. Id. at 462-63.
1150. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 462-63.
1151. Id. at 468-69.
1152. Id. at 464.
1153. Id.
1154. Id.
1155. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 464-67.
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about Mrs. Rapp in a positive way, utilizing the "common mind" rule. 1156
The court looked at how the information would be viewed by those to whom
the ideas were intended to be conveyed. 15 7  The intentional infliction of
emotional distress did not rise to the level of atrociousness necessary to sus-
tain it. 1158 False light invasion of privacy was another story, Gannett having
been decided a month earlier. 1159 The court concluded that misrepresentation
of a person's religious beliefs fell squarely within the definition of the tort of
false light invasion of privacy."" It was not as clear, however, to the court
that the tort exists in Florida, even though the Supreme Court of Florida de-
cisions seem to imply that the tort of false light invasion of privacy is recog-
nized in Florida. 16' The court allowed that if it was "writing on a blank
slate" it would reject the cause of action."62 However, given the "toehold"
that the cause of action has in Florida, the court certified the question as one
of great public importance as follows: "Does Florida recognize the tort of
false light invasion of privacy, and if so, are the elements of the tort set forth
in section 652E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts?"'1 163
D. Tortious Interference with Business Relationships
In Walters v. Blankenship,"' the Walters owned four units in a condo-
minium. 1165 They offered to sell all four at an auction which was to be with-
out reserve. 1166 Each bidder was required to deposit $50,000 in order to par-
ticipate, and more than twenty bidders participated. 1167 "On the day of the
auction, the defendants" who were owners of other units in the condominium
put "'for sale by owner' signs in front of their" units in violation of condo-
1156. Id. at 465 (internal quotations omitted).
1157. Id. This was true even though the newsletter was disseminated on the internet and
persons other than the intended group saw the newsletter. Id. The court, having found no
case where the Supreme Court of Florida adopted comment e to section 559 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, declined to adopt the rule that a communication is defamatory if the
"plaintiff is prejudiced in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority of the commu-
nity." Id. at 465-66. The court noted that if comment e applied, "a court might well find that
the amended complaint stated a claim for defamation." Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 466.
1158. Id. at 466-67.
1159. Id. at 467-68.
1160. Id. at 468.
1161. Id.
1162. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 468.
1163. Id.
1164. 931 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
1165. Id. at 138-39.
1166. Id. at 139.
1167. Id.
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minium rules. 1168 Immediately after the Walters' four units were sold at auc-
tion for an aggregate amount of more than $2 million, the defendants re-
moved the "for sale" signs. 1 169  The Waiters sued the defendants alleging
"tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy to commit [those
torts]."" 70 They sought combined total compensatory and punitive damages
totaling $6 million.17 ' The trial court dismissed the complaint with preju-
dice and the Walters appealed. 1172 The Fifth District Court of Appeal held
that the Walters did state a cause of action for tortious interference with pro-
spective economic advantage and civil conspiracy. 117' A cause of action for
tortious interference exists if the plaintiff alleges "1) the existence of a busi-
ness relationship; 2) the defendant's knowledge of the [business] relation-
ship; 3) the defendant's intentional and unjustified interference with the rela-
tionship; and 4) damages to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the rela-
tionship." ' 1 74 The court had no difficulty finding that the allegations fit the
cause of action.' 7 The court then set out the elements of civil conspiracy,
which could be based on tortious interference
or as an independent tort... a conspiracy between two or more
parties, to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by an unlawful
means, the doing of some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy,
and damage to plaintiff as a result of the acts performed pursuant
to the conspiracy. "
76
Again, the court found the plaintiffs allegations sufficient to state this
cause of action. 1177 One of the defendant owners was alleged to have said to
another unit owner: "'you wait until the day of the sale and see what we are
going to do to Dick Walters.""'178 The majority opinion did not discuss the
plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 1179 Judge
1168. Id.
1169. Walters, 931 So. 2d at 139.
1170. Id.
1171. Id.
1172. Id. at 138.
1173. Id. at 139-40.
1174. Walters, 931 So. 2d at 139 (citing Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647
So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994)).
1175. Id.
1176. Id. at 140.
1177. Id.
1178. Id. at 139.
1179. See generally Walters, 931 So. 2dat 137.
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Torpy concurred specially with an opinion.l 8° Judge Lawson dissented with
an opinion:."8'
E. Negligent Hiring
Mr. Copeland went into an Albertson's store, "brandish[ed] a knife,
robbed a clerk, and fled."" 82  He was pursued by store employees who
caught him in a neighboring parking lot."83 Copeland claimed that the em-
ployees attacked and injured him. 18 The employees claimed that Copeland
"threatened them with his knife" and that they were only trying "to restrain
him and protect themselves."" 85 Copeland "was convicted of armed robbery
and aggravated assault.""8 6 He then sued the employees for assault and bat-
tery and Albertson's for negligent hiring and training of its employees.""
The defendants moved for summary judgment which was granted." 8 The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded." 89 Section 776.085
of the Florida Statutes provides a defense to a civil action for damages based
on personal injury if the injury happened to "a participant during the com-
mission or attempted commission of a forcible felony."' 90 The defendants
raised the statutory defense in the trial court, but they failed to plead it or to
include it in their motion for summary judgment. "9' "A defendant cannot
present evidence of a statutory defense unless" pleaded." 92 Rule 1.510 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires "substantial matters of law" be
included in the motion and the motion be served at least twenty days before
the hearing on it. "' The statutory defense was a substantial matter of
law.' "' The defendants argued that the summary judgment could be upheld
anyway, since it was right, albeit for the wrong reason.'"" The statute was a
1180. Id. at 141 (Torpy, J., concurring).
1181. Id. at 143 (Lawson, J., dissenting).
1182. Copeland v. Albertson's, Inc., 947 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1183. Id.
1184. Id.
1185. Id.
1186. Id.
1187. Copeland, 947 So. 2d at 665.
1188. Id. at 665-66.
1189. Id. at 668.
1190. FLA. STAT. § 776.085(1) (2007).
1191. Copeland, 947 So. 2d at 666.
1192. Id.
1193. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.510(c).
1194. See Copeland, 947 So. 2d at 666.
1195. Id.
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total bar to Copeland's claim. "96 Copeland argued that the statute would not
apply because the forcible felony of which he was convicted occurred in the
store, and the actions about which he complained occurred outside of the
store after the felony had been committed. "97 Copeland raised a question of
fact concerning the applicability of the defense requiring reversal of the
summary judgment. "98
F. Vicarious Liability/Scope of Employment
In Huffinan v. Breezes Full Service Car Wash, 1199 Breezes was closed
one day on account of rain, and one of the owners took several of the em-
ployees went out to lunch. 2' Lackowski, a manager, was also there. 20'
Alchoholic beverages were consumed at lunch. 2 °2 After lunch, Lackowski
left in his car and collided with another automobile. 203 Melissa Jones, the
driver of the other car, was killed. 12' Her son, who was a passenger in her
car was injured.2 °5 The personal representatives of the estate of Melissa
Jones sued Breezes, among others, for wrongful death, "alleging that Breezes
was vicariously liable for negligent acts committed by" its employees.
206
Breezes moved for summary final judgment arguing "that it could not be
held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence" of its employees because
the facts showed that the employees had ceased acting in the scope of their
employment before the lunch. 1207 The trial court agreed and granted the mo-
tion for summary judgment. 1208 The appellate court, finding that "the trial
court improperly resolved disputed issues of fact," reversed the summary
judgment. 1209 The record did not resolve disputed issues of fact on the scope
of employment issue. 
2 1
1196. Id.
1197. Id. at 666-67.
1198. Id. at 667.
1199. 956 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
1200. Id.
1201. Id
1202. Id.
1203. Id.
1204. Huffinan, 956 So. 2d at 1204.
1205. Id.
1206. Id. at 1204-05. The managers, individually, and the restaurant were among the oth-
ers named as defendants. Id. at 1204.
1207. Id. at 1205.
1208. Huffman, 956 So. 2d at 1205.
1209. Id.
1210. Id.
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XIX. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND DEBTORICREDITOR RIGHTS
Substantial changes were made to Florida's version of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) that take effect on January 1, 2008.1211 An impor-
tant change is the clarification that the substantive rules of chapter 671 of the
Florida Statutes applies to all transactions governed by any chapter of the
UCC. 12 12 The UCC imposes "obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
ableness, and care [on the parties]."' 1213 These obligations may not be waived
by contract. 1214 However, the parties may agree on a standard of perform-
ance that will be upheld unless it is "manifestly unreasonable"' 1215 The new
statute provides that if the UCC requires that an action be done within a rea-
sonable time, the parties may set the time by agreement, as long as it is not
"manifestly unreasonable." 1216
There are extensive amendments to the definitions contained in section
671.201 of the Florida Statutes.1217 In addition, the new section 671.209
contains detailed definitions of "notice" and "knowledge."' 1218 "[A] person
has notice of a fact if the person: a) [h]as actual knowledge of it; b) [h]as
received a notice or notification of it;" or c) has reason to know of the exis-
tence of a fact based on other facts and circumstances "known to the person
at the time."' 1219 Knowledge is the same as actual knowledge. 122' There are
numerous other aspects of notice that are addressed by this new section, in-
cluding when notice is considered provided and when notice is received or
considered to have been received. 1221
Notably, new section 671.211 of the Florida Statutes provides that "a
person gives value for rights" if the rights are acquired "[a]s security for, or
in ... satisfaction of, a preexisting claim; [b]y accepting delivery under a
preexisting contract; [i]n return for any consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract; or [i]n return for a binding commitment to extend credit or
1211. See generally Act effective Jan. 1, 2008, ch. 2007-134, §§ 4-31, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 1115, 1115-29 (West).
1212. Id. § 4, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1117 (amending FLA. STAT. § 671.101 (2007)).
1213. Id. § 5, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1117 (amending FLA. STAT. § 671.102(2)(b)
(2007)).
1214. Id.
1215. Id.
1216. Ch. 2007-134, § 5, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1117.
1217. See id. § 8, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1118-23 (amending FLA. STAT. § 671.201
(2007)).
1218. Id. § 15, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1124 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.209).
1219. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.209(1)(a)-(c)).
1220. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.209(2)).
1221. Ch. 2007-134, § 15, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1124 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
671.209(4)-(6)).
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for the extension of immediately available credit."'1222 There are exceptions
provided for those situations elsewhere in the UCC where value has a differ-
ent meaning, more specifically, with respect to negotiable instruments and
bank collections. 1
223
New section 671.212 of the Florida Statutes, dealing with electronic
signatures, provides that the UCC "modifies, limits, and supersedes the fed-
eral Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act," except
with respect to electronic delivery of certain notices. 1
224
There were substantial statutory revisions in 2007, effective July 1,
2007, with respect to a debtor's assignment of assets for the benefit of credi-
tors. 1225 The statute prohibits levy, execution, and attachment by a judgment
creditor, other than a consensual lienholder, against assets of the assignor
that are in the possession or control of the assignee. 1226 Consensual lienhold-
ers may enforce their rights in the collateral subject to the lien. 1227 A defini-
tion of consensual lienholder was added.1228 The definition of "assets" for
purposes of chapter 727 of the Florida Statutes was amended to include
"claims and causes of action," including tort claims. 1229 The statute also al-
lows the assignee to make a secondary assignment of claims. 1230 Under the
new statute, the assignee may operate the assignor's business for no more
than fourteen days without court authorization. 1231  To operate the business
for more than fourteen days, but less than forty-five days, court authorization
and notice to creditors may become necessary depending upon whether any
objections are made. 1232 After forty-five days, court authorization is required
if there is an objection to the assignee's "motion for authority to operate the
assignor's business."' 1233 The statute allows an assignee to reject an unex-
pired lease. 1234 Unlike the prior statute, a limitation on damages is provided
in the event the assignee rejects a lease or terminates employment con-
1222. Id. § 17, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.211).
1223. Id.
1224. Id. § 18, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.212).
1225. See generally Act effective July 1, 2007, ch. 2007-185, §§ 3-13, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 1314, 1315-24 (West).
1226. FLA. STAT. § 727.105 (2007).
1227. Id.
1228. Ch. 2007-185, § 3, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1316 (amending FLA. STAT. § 727.103
(2007)).
1229. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 727.103(1)).
1230. FLA. STAT. § 727.108(1)(a) (2007).
1231. Id. § 727.108(4).
1232. Id.
1233. Id.
1234. Id. § 727.108(5).
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tracts.1235 There are also new provisions with respect to objections to claims
and priority of claims, those sections having been rewritten. 1
236
Section 222.25 of the Florida Statutes increases to $4000-from
$1000-the amount of personal property that a person can exempt from the
claims of creditors, provided the person does not receive the benefit of the
homestead exemption under article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitu-
tion.1237 If the person does have a homestead exemption, then the personal
property exemption is $1000, as provided in the Florida Constitution. 1238
XX. WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, AND SPOUSAL RIGHTS
A. Marital Agreements
Florida enacted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, effective Octo-
ber 1, 2007, with prospective effect. 123 9 The statute does not affect agree-
ments made under sections 732.701 and 732.702 of the Florida Probate
Code.'2" The new statute sets forth both a nonexclusive list of subjects that
may be covered by the agreement, such as property rights, spousal support,
life insurance, choice of law, and grounds for invalidation. 1241  Premarital
agreements must be in writing and signed by the parties, as must amend-
ments and revocations. 1
242
B. Dissolution of Marriage
In Haley v. Haley,1243 the Fifth District Court of Appeal was asked to
decide if capital loss carry forwards, resulting from non-marital property,
belong to the property-owning spouse or constitute marital property. 24 John
and Myra divorced. 1245 Myra had brought to the marriage, as non-marital
property, an interest in Igo Family Partnership (Igo), a partnership formed by
1235. FLA. STAT. § 727.112(6)-(7).
1236. Id. §§ 727.113-.114.
1237. Id. § 222.25(4). The personal property exemption does not apply to claims for spous-
al or child support. Id.
1238. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(2).
1239. Act effective Oct. 1, 2007, ch. 2007-171, §§ 1-3, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1244,
1244-45 (West) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.079 (2007)).
1240. FLA. STAT. § 61.079(10) (2007).
1241. Id. § 61.079(4), (7)-(8).
1242. Id. § 61.079(3), (6).
1243. 936 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
1244. See id. at 1137-38.
1245. Id. at 1137.
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Myra's parents before Myra's marriage. 1246 "It was undisputed [that] John
had no interest in Igo ... , 1247 The Igo passed through capital losses to Myra
during the marriage, resulting in capital loss carry forwards. 12 48 The issue
was whether the capital loss carry forwards that could offset capital gains in
later tax years were marital assets subject to equitable distribution between
John and Myra. 249 The trial court determined that the capital loss carry for-
wards were owned by John and Myra as tenants in common after the dissolu-
tion of marriage.1250 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed.251 The
court decided as an issue of first impression in Florida that capital loss carry
forwards resulting from non-marital property belong to the property-owning
spouse, that is, the carry forwards are not marital property.1252 The court also
cited section 1.1212-1 of the Treasury Regulations in support of its deci-
sion. 1253
In Wamsley v. Wamsley, 154 the Second District Court of Appeal held
that it was proper for a husband to have excluded his distributive share of S
corporation net income from his financial affidavits."255 The Second District
Court of Appeal, relying on the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Zold
v. Zold,1256 held that the trial court did not err in excluding undistributed
pass-through income from the husband's gross income. 1257  Zold "set the
standard for determining" if S corporation distributions are gross income
under chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes. 1251 Under Zold, the burden is on the
shareholder-spouse to show that the S corporation income was properly re-
tained for business purposes, rather than "to avoid alimony, child support or
attorney's fees obligations."' 1259 Factors to be considered include the amount
of control the shareholder has over the income, any statutory restrictions that
would preclude distribution by the corporation, and any other reasons why
the income is being "retained by the corporation." 126° Husband, the chief
executive officer and majority shareholder of an S corporation, explained
1246. Id.
1247. Id.
1248. See Haley, 936 So. 2d at 1137-38.
1249. Id. at 1137.
1250. Id. at 1138
1251. Id. at 1140.
1252. Id. at 1139-40.
1253. Haley, 936 So. 2d at 1139 n.3; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1212-1 (as amended in 1980).
1254. 957 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1255. Id. at 91.
1256. 911 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2005).
1257. Wamsley, 957 So. 2d at 91.
1258. Id.
1259. Id.
1260. Id.
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that there were business reasons why the income could not be distributed to
him. 126' The wife failed to rebut husband's evidence as to the corporation's
need to retain the income for its corporate needs, and she failed to present
evidence that husband caused the corporation to withhold distributions in
order to avoid his obligations in connection with the divorce. 12 62 The court
held that Zold applied although it was decided after the Wamsley hearing in
the trial court, since the facts demonstrated that the trial court could reasona-
bly have reached the conclusion that the corporation was statutorily required
to retain the income to meet its debts. 1
263
C. Wills, Trusts, and Elective Share
The Second District Court of Appeal in Trenchard v. Estate of Gray,121
relying on Dempsey v. Dempsey,1265 held that the trial court's order determin-
ing that the decedent's interest in jointly held property was part of the elec-
tive estate was not a final, appealable order. 2 ' The surviving joint tenant,
claimed ownership of the property, and appealed the trial court's order."267
Issues regarding ownership, amount of elective share, and contribution had
not been determined. 1268 Thus, the order was a non-final, non-appealable
order. 1269
The Second District Court of Appeal noted that the trial court had also
entered an order allowing the surviving spouse to file a lis pendens.
127
However, the appellant did not appeal that order. 1
271
D. Homestead
Mrs. Cutler died, survived by a son and a daughter. 1272 She was not sur-
vived by a spouse. 1273 Not long before she died, at a time when she was un-
1261. See id.at 91-92.
1262. Wamsley, 957 So. 2d at 92.
1263. Id. at 91-92 (citing FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(3)(a) (2005)).
1264. 950 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1265. 899 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that an order determining
entitlement to elective share, which is a non-final and non-appealable order as judicial labor
on issues involved, is not terminated).
1266. Trenchard, 950 So. 2d at 1278.
1267. Id.
1268. Id.
1269. Id.
1270. Id.
1271. Trenchard, 950 So. 2d at 1278.
1272. Cutler v. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D583 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2007).
1273. Id.
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married, she created the Cutler Irrevocable Land Trust naming herself and
her two children as co-trustees. 274 She deeded two parcels of real estate to
the trust.1275 The first parcel was her residence, in which she retained a life
estate. 1276 The second parcel was a vacant lot adjacent to her residence. 1277
The trust agreement provided that all assets remaining in the trust when Mrs.
Cutler died were to be distributed to her estate. 1278 Under the will, she spe-
cifically devised her residence to her daughter and the vacant lot to her
son. 1279 The provision in the will that dealt with debts, administration ex-
penses, and tax apportionment directed payment of these items from Mrs.
Cutler's residuary estate. 1280 To the extent that the residuary was insuffi-
cient, then these items were to be charged in equal shares to the daughter's
and son's devises. 1281' Naturally, there was a shortfall, and the son argued
that both devises were required by the terms of the will to abate equally. 1
282
The daughter's position was that her devise was of homestead property and
was constitutionally protected from abatement. 1283  The trial court agreed
with the daughter, and the son appealed. 1284 Referring to Snyder v. Davis, 1
285
the Third District Court of Appeal reviewed the facts in evidence to deter-
mine if the real property was "protected homestead" exempt from forced sale
for payment of creditor's claims after Mrs. Cutler died. 1286 It was the daugh-
ter's burden to prove: 1) the property was devised to her; 2) she is an heir
within the meaning of the article X, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution;
and 3) when Mrs. Cutler died, the real estate was Mrs. Cutler's home-
stead. 1287 The court ruled that the daughter had proved each element. 128 8 The
son argued that to be protected homestead, the real property had to have been
owned by a natural person and here it was held in an irrevocable trust. 1
289
The court dismissed this argument by noting that Mrs. Cutler's life estate
was a property interest eligible for homestead status-at least from the
1274. Id.
1275. Id.
1276. Id.
1277. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D583.
1278. Id.
1279. Id.
1280. See id. at D584.
1281. Id.
1282. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D584.
1283. Id.
1284. Id. at D583.
1285. 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997).
1286. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D584.
1287. Id.
1288. Id. atD586.
1289. Id. at D585.
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standpoint of forced sale and the homestead real estate tax exemption-
because she had resided on the property for many years, and thus was an
"owner" of her residence for purposes of making a devise of protected home-
stead. 1290 The court also noted that other courts had ruled that real estate held
in trusts, albeit revocable trusts, 1291 could retain its character as home-
stead. 1292 The Third District Court of Appeal saw no reason why this should
be otherwise for real estate held in irrevocable trusts. 1293 Judge Schwartz
dissented. 12
94
1290. Id.
1291. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D585.
1292. Id.
1293. Id.
1294. Id. at D586 (Schwartz, J., dissenting). With respect to another context where home-
stead issues have arisen, there are now contrary decisions between the District Courts of Ap-
peal as to whether or not a cooperative apartment is homestead for purposes of article X, sec-
tion 4(c) of the Florida Constitution and section 732.4015 of the Florida Probate Code. See
Phillips v. Hirshon, 958 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that a coopera-
tive apartment is not homestead for purposes of devise and descent). The Third District Court
of Appeal certified, conflicting with the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Southern
Walls, Inc. v. Stilwell Corp., because of the different results that may be reached in the various
contexts in which the determination of homestead is relevant. Compare Southern Walls, Inc.
v. Stilwell Corp., 810 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002), with Phillips, 958 So. 2d at
430.
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